THE SECURITY MODEL DISCUSSION 1995-1996

REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE TO THE

LISBON SUMMIT

Lisbon, 30 November 1996

Swiss OSCE Chairmanship

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE SECURITY MODEL DISCUSSION 1995-1996

SUMMARY

On the basis of the mandate given by the 1994 Budapest Summit, OSCE participating States engaged in a discussion on a common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century. In 1995, the discussion focused mainly on risks and challenges in the OSCE area and identified first elements of a common response to such risks. A broad conceptual exploration was initiated.

The decisions of the Ministerial Council of December 1995 moved the work into a more operational phase. On the basis of the discussion of general principles held in 1995, new guidelines and a more concrete follow-up programme in preparation for the 1996 Lisbon Summit were adopted.

In 1996, the role of international organizations from conflict prevention through crisis management and on to post-conflict rehabilitation was analysed. The need for better implementation of OSCE principles and commitments, the development of a real culture of co-operation between organizations active in the OSCE area and the need for enhancement of the OSCE's operational capabilities were stressed. As requested by the Ministerial Council of 1995, the Chairman-in-Office submitted under his own responsibility an updated list of risks and challenges.

1.   The mandate given by the Budapest Summit 1994

At the Budapest Summit Meeting on 5 and 6 December 1994, the Heads of State or Government of CSCE participating States decided to launch in the CSCE a broad and comprehensive discussion on all aspects of security aimed at devising a concept of security for the twenty-first century, taking into account the ongoing debates in participating States on this topic. They further specified that this discussion would not affect the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. The Heads of State or Government requested the Chairman-in-Office to present a progress report to the next meeting of the Ministerial Council and to submit the results obtained on that occasion to the next Summit Meeting.[1]

2.   Work done in 1995

The Hungarian Chairmanship was faced at the beginning of 1995 with the difficult task of initiating, structuring and leading the discussion on the security model. The first meeting of the Senior Council (31 March 1995) was the starting point of the discussion. Subsequently, an ad hoc Working Group at ambassadorial level was established that held meetings, as a rule on a biweekly basis. Several seminars were held on that subject, one in Moscow on 17 and 18 July 1995 and another in Vienna on 18 and 19 September 1995. The security model was again on the agenda at the Third Meeting of the Senior Council (27 October 1995).

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[1]   CSCE Budapest Document 1994, Budapest Decisions, Chapter VII, p. 20

In 1995, work on the security model was principally devoted to conceptual exploration and to defining the organizational modalities of the discussion. The first discussions addressed parameters of work, including the principles that would serve for its foundation. From the outset, there was broad consensus that these should include the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security, the notion of indivisible security, the desire to create a common space of security, stability and co-operation, and the belief that all participating States should make an active contribution to this work. The participating States mapped out a programme according to which early discussions were to concentrate on underlying principles of common security, the various risks and challenges to security in the OSCE area, and the appropriate tools and approaches for addressing them.

In the early stages of the work there was agreement to make the discussion an open and non-exclusive process, because a future security model is not exclusively about the OSCE and involves work being done by other international organizations, scholars, experts, etc. With a view to broadening the OSCE's discussion on a security model, representatives from other international organizations, NGOs, and academic and research institutions were invited to contribute to the Security Model Seminars and to other discussions.

The identification of risks and challenges to security formed the main activity of the discussion in 1995. A wide range of risks and challenges were addressed, although mostly in a rather general way. A working paper presented by France-European Union served as the basis of the discussion. It distinguished political, military, economic, social and environmental factors of instability and listed more than 20 risks and challenges. Through the discussion, it became obvious that security and risk perception varies depending on geographical location and degree of integration in security arrangements. Several States have requested that discussion of risks and challenges remain an ongoing and open item for future consideration. On the basis of the European Union paper and the results of the discussion, the Hungarian Chair submitted at the Fifth Meeting of the Ministerial Council its list of risks and challenges.[2]

There was agreement that both in the work on the security model and as an objective of a security model, co-operation with and between international organizations needed to be improved. A close working relationship with them should be established through the course of this effort; their visions of an emerging security architecture and the roles they see their organizations playing should be integrated into the discussion. It was underlined by many delegations that co-operation between the organizations must be founded on transparency, information and consultation and flexibility as well as on the principle of the comparative advantage of each and every organization, thereby allowing a mutually beneficial and mutually reinforcing security network.

3.   Decision of the Fifth Meeting of the Ministerial Council 1995

At the Fifth Meeting of the Ministerial Council that took place in Budapest on 7 and 8 December 1995, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs took note of the progress report presented by the Chairman-in-Office and decided to move the work on the security model into a more operational phase. They also set new guidelines for the discussion and defined a follow-up work programme in preparation for the 1996 Lisbon Summit. The Ministerial Council entrusted the Chairman-in-Office with the task of intensifying focused discussion on all

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[2]   Risks and Challenges to Security in the OSCE Area (REF.PC/418/95/Rev.2, 4 December 1995)

aspects of a security model. The Ministers also decided to set up a special Security Model Committee, under the auspices of the Permanent Council. The Chairman-in-Office was requested to keep the informal list of risks and challenges updated and to present the progress achieved and the results available at the time of the 1996 Lisbon Summit for consideration and assessment. Organization of further seminars within the context of the work on a security model was requested and a wide-ranging discussion on a security model, with broad participation of government officials, non-governmental representatives and scholars, encouraged. The annex of the security model decision contained an indicative list of areas for debate on a security model.[3]

4.   Work done in 1996

The Swiss Chairman-in-Office, in his intervention before the Permanent Council on 11 January 1996, placed the discussion on the security model in the context of enhancing European security co-operation and avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. He invited delegations to submit their ideas and proposals as soon as possible. Subsequently the Security Model Committee started work on 19 January and held 18 meetings throughout 1996.

During the work of the Security Model Committee the following participating States made written contributions: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland-European Union, Italy-European Union, Kazakstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and the United States of America.

In early sessions, issues such as conflict prevention including early warning and preventive diplomacy as well as crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation were discussed in the Security Model Committee. These discussions gave a clearer picture of the role and instruments of the OSCE and other organizations in the crisis cycle and permitted identification of ideas on how the OSCE contribution could be improved. The comparative advantages of the OSCE were also discussed. The discussion remained open in order to continue to address a wide variety of conceptual and more specific issues pertaining to security in Europe.

The discussion on a security model was given further stimulus at the Fourth Meeting of the Senior Council in Prague (21 and 22 March 1996). It was widely recognized that, like the Lisbon Summit as a whole, the result of the security model discussion would depend on the wider political context at that time. Building upon all the earlier commitments adopted by the OSCE, a new platform for co-operative security could be considered that would tackle the need to enhance the security of all OSCE States in a constructive climate of mutually reinforcing institutions. That platform should contribute to the creation of a common security space for Europe, free of dividing lines, in addition to fostering the emergence of a real culture of co-operation.

During the Fourth Economic Forum in Prague (27-29 March 1996), the question of how economic factors affect security and stability was analysed. A wide range of proposals

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[3]   Budapest Ministerial Council Meeting, Decision on a common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century: A new concept for a new century, 7-8 December 1995, MC(5).DEC/2

on social and economic elements having a direct bearing on security was produced. They focused on establishing and developing a clear, predictable and effective legal framework, including due process of law and independent courts; on balancing economic structures to forestall the emergence of unduly great disparities in wealth and income within a society; and on guaranteeing a social system which prevents any social group form feeling excluded from society. The outcome of the debate at the Economic Forum was submitted to the Security Model Committee in Vienna.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly decided to make the discussion of a "common and comprehensive security model for the twenty-first century" the central theme of the Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session in Stockholm in July of 1996. The Parliamentary Assembly had earlier participated in the Security Model Seminar in Vienna and submitted a broad range of ideas and recommendations to the Permanent Council in the spring of 1996.

During the spring and summer of 1996, a number of delegations tabled proposals in the Security Model Committee in the form of non-papers which prompted interesting discussions. There was broad consensus that the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments needed to be enhanced. Strict adherence to OSCE values was recognized as being of paramount importance for stability and security in the OSCE region. Measures on how to improve implementation and on how to defend the integrity of OSCE common values against continued gross violation were explored.

It was generally agreed that inter-institutional interaction between all organizations active in the OSCE region should be strengthened and qualitatively improved through new principles and measures that could be elaborated in the discussion. However, it was stressed that this cooperation must be non-hierarchical and based on the principle of comparative advantage in order not to infringe the autonomy of other organizations and not to duplicate other efforts already being made. The view was supported that a culture of co-operation needed to be developed whereby different organizations complement each other mutually and reinforce each other's actions for peace and security. Proposals for concrete measures such as systematic information exchange, regular high-level consultations and creation of liaison structures have been discussed.

Participating States also agreed that the results of the security model discussion needed to be reflected in the development of the OSCE. The discussion should contribute to a better definition of the role and functions of the OSCE, in itself and in its interaction with other organizations. The need to clarify the OSCE's role in the security co-operation network, to make better use of existing instruments and to strengthen the OSCE's operational capabilities was highlighted.

One meeting of the Security Model Committee (28 June 1996) was exclusively devoted to an academic input to the discussion. The meeting in question embarked on a lively question and answer session covering a broad range of issues relevant to the security model discussion in its broader political context.

On 11 October, a special meeting of the Security Model Committee held intensive deliberations in Vienna. This meeting may be considered as the beginning of the negotiation process for a Lisbon security model document and for a follow-up work programme. The special meeting involved delegates from capitals and saw active involvement of participating States which had been less active during the preceding discussion. The discussion still remained to a large extent general. A wide variety of diverging views was expressed, for instance with regard to further refinement of commitments, the appropriateness of political or

legally binding instruments, possible formats for non-hierarchic co-operation between organizations, common responses in cases of gross violations of commitments, and issues concerning the OSCE as an institution. The conclusion was drawn that the Lisbon Document should be an independent, short document in the form of a political declaration and should go well beyond recalling existing principles and commitments. It should focus on the principles governing security co-operation among OSCE participating States and on the principles of a non-hierarchic co-operation among interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions. It was also recognized that the discussion should continue after Lisbon.

During the weeks following the special meeting, in particular during the Review Meeting, discussion continued on the basis of a Chairman's food-for-thought paper compiling building-blocks derived from proposals and statements by delegations.[4] This non-paper provoked many specific comments and made it possible further to clarify the positions of participating States. The conceptualization of the principle of mutually-reinforcing institutions was increasingly confirmed as the core of the declaration. A discussion on follow-up work also took place. Subsequently, among other delegations Ireland-European Union submitted papers permitting further discussion on the concept of developing co-operation between mutually reinforcing institutions and a more in-depth discussion on the possible contents of the envisaged political declaration on the security model, thus preparing for the negotiations on Summit documents during the Lisbon Preparatory Meeting.[5]

The Mediterranean partners for co-operation as well as Japan and the Republic of Korea were drawn into the work on the security model, underlining the close links between security in the OSCE region and in adjacent areas. They were invited to participate in two sessions of the Security Model Committee. The Contact Group for the Mediterranean partners for co-operation kept the topic under discussion, and a special Contact Group meeting that took place on 1 and 2 July 1996 in Vienna was devoted to that issue. Among the subjects discussed were terrorism, extremism, intolerance and gross violations of human rights as well as other elements identified as priority risks. A document reflecting the discussions held within the Contact Group for the Mediterranean partners for co-operation was produced. In the perception of the Chairman-in-Office, the contents of this document are widely shared among the members of the Contact Group, including the five Mediterranean partners for co-operation. The document is annexed to this report.

5.   Lisbon Preparatory Meeting

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[4]   Food for thought. Some elements for possible inclusion in the Lisbon Declaration on the Security Model (REF.S/16/96)

[5]   EU Platform for Cooperative Security (REF.RM/182/96) and EU Contribution to the Lisbon Declaration on Security in Europe (REF.PC/742/96)

Between 25 and 29 November 1996, the participating States held intense negotiations and consultations at the Preparatory Meeting for the Lisbon Summit, preparing the documents to be submitted to the Heads of State and Government for adoption. During this period it became obvious that many ideas put forward by delegations in earlier discussions did not meet with consensus, for instance the idea of strengthening the OSCE by creating a consultative body with restricted membership or developing legal instruments. Taking into account the long-term perspective of the security model discussion, it would be worth exploring such ideas further in the years to come. The Chairman-in-Office hopes that the adoption of a declaration on the security model will be one of the main results of the Lisbon Summit.

Annexes

-       Risks and Challenges to Security in the OSCE Area (Annex 1, revised version of REF.PC/418/95 Rev.2)

-       Report by the Chairman of the Contact Group for the Mediterranean partners for co-operation (Annex 2, revised version of REF.RM/76/96 Rev.1)

RISKS AND CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN THE OSCE AREA

This document identifies, in summary form, risks and challenges to security in the OSCE area, as perceived and articulated by participating States in the course of the security model discussion. On the basis of the non-paper submitted by the Hungarian Chairmanship on 1 December 1995 (REF.PC/418/95/Rev.2), this informal list gives an update as requested in the security model decision adopted at the Fifth Meeting of the Ministerial Council in Budapest on 8 December 1995.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

OSCE participating States have commonly elaborated and commonly agreed on values pertaining to relations between States and to their relation to the citizens inside of a State. Security in the OSCE region is based on the respect for these values and for the principles, norms and commitments participating States have undertaken to comply with.

Lack of implementation, non-compliance and gross violations of these principles, norms and commitments are the main risks and challenges to security in the OSCE area.

Risks and challenges occur in all fields of human activity. Developments of very differing types - political, military, human dimension, economic, social and environmental - all have the potential to put security at risk. Many of them are interconnected and, consequently, a risk within one dimension may affect the situation in other fields.

Most of the risks and challenges in the OSCE region are common to adjacent areas. This document therefore also reflects perceptions of OSCE partners for co-operation, which have contributed on several occasions to the elaboration of this list.

This document focuses on root risks, long-term risks and risks that have the inherent capability of jeopardizing peace and security in the OSCE area. It makes no claims to completeness and does not include derivative and more transitional risks that do not directly jeopardize peace and security.

RISKS AND CHALLENGES

1.   Military risks

Although the risks stemming from military capabilities have been drastically reduced, some still exist. Lack of democratic control of armed forces, lack of authority of governments over armed groups, and non-compliance with the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security and humanitarian law by the armed forces constitute one cluster of root risks. The other lies in excessive and unbalanced arms build-ups at regional and subregional levels.

-       Insufficient democratic control of armed forces and defence planning

- Tolerance of forces not accountable to or controlled by constitutionally established State authorities
- Non-observance or circumvention of arms-control obligations and insufficient response to violations of these obligations
- Re-nationalization of defence coupled with a possible qualitative arms race
- Excessive (sub)regional arms build-ups and disturbance of established (sub)regional military balances that may adversely affect stability
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal transfer of dual-use material and technology, and transfer of knowledge and expertise
- Non-compliance with the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security and the humanitarian law
- Incommensurate recourse to force in performing internal enforcement missions
- Disproportionate concentration of armed forces in crisis regions
- Presence of foreign troops without agreement of the host government

2. <u>Political risks</u>

Political risks generally stem from claims to hegemony, aggressive nationalism and a propensity to use force to settle disputes between and inside States. These tendencies are aggravated by weak democratic institutions and the absence or inadequate development of pluralism and the rule of law. The lack of a rapid and resolute response by the international community increases these risks.

- Violation of the obligations undertaken by States under the United Nations Charter and international treaties and agreements
- Inclination to use force internally and externally to settle problems
- Violent secessionist movements challenging the territorial integrity of States
- Willingness to resolve ethnic/nationalist-based territorial conflicts and claims for self-determination by use of force
- Terrorist acts and practices
- External support or instigation of secessionist movements aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States
- Danger that non-State groups or movements put the security of States at risk
- Attempts to create spheres of influence or regional domination
- Attempts to intimidate States in order to influence the free will to join or to remain apart from regional security arrangements
- Creation of new dividing lines in place of old ones
- Distrust and confrontational approaches as a consequence of the survival of a cold-war mentality
- Lack of transparency, mutual trust and co-operation in crisis situations
- Inability of new democratic structures to implement the constitutional order and to protect citizens against discrimination and intimidation by armed groups and criminal organizations
- Lack of democratic political culture providing for peaceful settlement of tensions and conflicts
- Fragility of the rule of law and insufficient civil society structures
- Lack of decisiveness and political will of the international community to defend and guarantee common principles
- Slow pace of adaptation of security organizations to new situations

3.   <u>Risks to democracy, rule of law, human rights, civil society</u>

Violations of the norms and principles in this field are not only intrinsically reprehensible but also give rise to extremism, aggravate tensions and can bring about intra- as well as inter-State conflicts. Such risks may lead to violence, violent secessionism, mass emigration/deportation and even to ethnic cleansing. They can be an inducement to the use of force by the victims of such violations.

-       Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms
-       Cultural and religious misconceptions and prejudices
-       Lack of transparency of executive agencies and State administrations in internal affairs
-       Discrimination and harassment of persons belonging to national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic minorities
-       Discrimination by sex
-       Non-respect for "free and fair" democratic elections and non-acceptance of the rules of democracy (*inter alia* intimidation of political parties and their leaders, electoral fraud in order to secure majority in elections, unequal access to media for different parties)
-       Infringement of the freedom of media
-       Constraining limitations for civil society groups and representatives
-       Manipulation of human rights and minority issues to achieve political goals, including the expansion of political influence or regional domination
-       Political movements resorting to aggressive nationalism, racism, xenophobia, chauvinism, anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance
-       Linking of criminal elements with State structures
-       Corruption and organized crime, especially arms and drug trafficking and money laundering

4.   <u>Economic challenges</u>

Economic difficulties can easily become sources of social tensions and large-scale unrest, which in turn may fuel populist and nationalistic upheavals. Criminal economic activities undermine the citizens' confidence in the State and its organs and prompt measures of self-defence. The use of economic pressure for political purposes (such as unilateral embargoes, denial of resource allocation, economic discrimination of specific groups or countries) can lead to tensions and crisis situations.

-       Economic hardships such as declining standards of living, rise in unemployment, high inflation
-       Unduly great disparities in wealth and income within societies
-       Unduly great economic disparities between countries and regions
-       Lack of an efficient and fair social security network
-       Inadequate social policy which could endanger consistent implementation of economic reforms
-       Slow, inconsistent and unpredictable steps in the economic reform process
-       Economic pressures (such as denial of water and energy supply, refusal of the use of transport systems etc.) and blockades exerted unilaterally by one State on another in pursuance of political goals

5.   Social risks

The social texture has changed dramatically following the political revolution of 1989/90 and during the economic reform process. Social hardship undermines the cohesion of society. It puts considerable strain on the social solidarity networks - both public and private. Higher educational and professional requirements on the labour market tend to lead to a two-tier society with huge groups that feel excluded from the benefits of society. This in turn can lead to political unrest.

-       Polarization and fragmentation of societies
-       Impoverishment and marginalization of individuals, large social groups and communities
-       Uncontrolled migratory flows
-       Hardships suffered by refugees, displaced persons and persons without citizenship
-       Chaotic urbanization and lack of social structures

6.   Environmental hazards

Environmental hazards affect the security of human beings and societies very directly. Heavily polluted land no longer produces crops. People can no longer live in contaminated areas. The breakdown of the military-industrial complex makes clean-ups of huge production facilities necessary. Nuclear production and waste storage facilities are very vulnerable and harbour risks that could have devastating consequences.

-       Extensive ecological disaster zones contaminated by nuclear and chemical waste
-       Irresponsible use of natural resources
-       Improper handling of dangerous/toxic substances in connection with disarmament, dismantling and weapons testing activities (both conventional and nuclear/chemical)
-       Inadequate safety standards in industrial production, especially in nuclear power stations
-       Lack of training/awareness in the handling of high-risk industrial production processes
-       Erosion and contamination of soil by over-intensified agricultural production

REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONTACT GROUP FOR THE
MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS FOR CO-OPERATION

CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY MODEL[(*)]

I.   General Principles

1.   Security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole. The OSCE, since Helsinki, has consistently underlined the importance it attaches to its relationship with the MPCs for security and co-operation in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The response to this interdependence is effective and permanent dialogue and co-operation between the OSCE and the MPCs based on the OSCE's comprehensive and co-operative concept of security and the indivisibility of that security. This concept encompasses political, military, economic and environmental questions as well as the human dimension, including cultural aspects. This dialogue should help to make the Euro-Mediterranean area a region of peace, stability and partnership, and might also positively influence adjacent areas.

2.   Security co-operation between the OSCE and the MPCs is founded on commonly shared values and principles as well as common risks and challenges. It aims at imparting a better understanding of OSCE norms and activities, at creating a common analysis and understanding of security in the Euro-Mediterranean region and, eventually, at identifying and elaborating common and co-operative answers to the risks and challenges, thereby enhancing stability and security.

3.   The OSCE is committed to pursuing its partnership and dialogue with the MPCs in a flexible way, among other things through consideration of ways of strengthening co-operation within OSCE institutions. This should complement and reinforce bilateral and multilateral co-operation in other institutional fora such as the Barcelona Conference and its follow-up, with due regard to the principle of comparative advantage. In this context, regular links and exchanges of information should be established between the OSCE and the other relevant processes and organizations.

II.   Priority Areas

4.   Concrete measures will be explored in areas where the OSCE has acquired specific expertise and can share its experience with its Mediterranean Partners: the development of CSBMs, preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, human rights, and such other items on the list of risks and challenges attached to the 1995 Budapest Ministerial Decision on the Security Model as are relevant to the circumstances of the MPCs. In this context, issues related to terrorism, social and economic disparities and cultural and religious misperceptions meet with wide interest.

[(*)]   This contribution reflects the discussion on the security model in the Contact Group. The Chair has noted that its contents are widely shared among the members of the Contact Group, including the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation.

III.   Common Responses

5.   Co-operation regarding the political and military aspects of security should focus on CSBMs and conflict prevention. The OSCE will share its expertise and co-operate with the MPCs in these areas, as appropriate, in developing such instruments. In the area of conflict prevention, the OSCE should open a dialogue and exchange its experience with the regional organizations to which the MPCs belong, such as the OAU and other organizations, as appropriate.

6.   As regards the human dimension, the OSCE and the MPCs, while recognizing the various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds of States and emphasizing the universality of human rights, will co-operate in their efforts to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The establishment of National Human Rights Commissions will be encouraged in MPCs where they have not yet been set up. Special attention will be given to developing confidence- and security-building measures designed to avoid misinformation, distorted images and misperceptions of different cultures and religions and to ensure mutual understanding and the free flow of ideas and information between different cultural and religious traditions. The OSCE and the MPCs could promote exchanges between the actors of civil society, for example through exchange programmes between educational institutions and the media, and could explore the possibility of establishing fora for intercultural communication and exchange among young people and competent NGOs. The ODIHR should envisage, in close co-operation with the MPCs, the possibility of holding seminars on democratic institution building in MPCs. Follow-up to these seminars should be regularly included in the agenda of the Contact Group.

7.   As terrorism in all its forms, especially in its international ramifications, constitutes a threat to all societies, combating it is a common task for the OSCE and the MPCs. The strengthening of democracy and human rights, together with economic growth and social justice and enhanced co-operation in combating all forms of organized crime, reduce the vulnerability of societies to terrorism. The strengthening of the rule of law and the true values of religions should be furthered. In a more detailed way, the OSCE participating States and the MPCs should work together, in collaboration with other relevant institutions and processes, towards more effective implementation of existing relevant international instruments.

8.   Discussions on the economic aspects of security as well as on other related economic, environmental and social issues should be held within the framework of the Economic Forum and in the context of other relevant OSCE economic dimension activities. The OSCE and MPCs should also focus their discussions on environmental issues, giving special consideration to the fight against marine pollution, and the sustainable use of natural resources, including water.

IV.   Follow-up

9.   On the basis of the principles, priorities and common responses defined above, it is recommended that the Contact Group, in its future activities, should focus on concrete measures which seem likely to enhance security and stability in the Euro-Mediterranean area. In this context, the OSCE could envisage the possibility of intensifying the involvement of the MPCs in the work on the security model.