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Building bridges
Security community and partnerships for change

OSCE Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe

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Foreword by the Secretary General

This publication is based on a seminar held at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, on 5 April 2011 on "Building bridges: security community and partnerships for change".

From its inception the OSCE has encompassed and bridged multiple partnerships, and provided a forum for dialogue and discussion — between states, and with civil society — to address pressing security challenges. Inclusiveness has always been one of our greatest strengths.

The seminar looked at how all the different threads of diplomacy — formal and informal — can build stronger partnerships and networks to promote change and build a more secure community for all.

At the OSCE Summit last year, our 56 States reaffirmed core values and commitments in the "Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community". Contributions to this publication look at what such a security community might look like and how we can achieve it, tackling persisting and new challenges.

Developments in the southern Mediterranean have reminded us of certain events in the OSCE area in the early nineties – the challenges of the transition to stable and vibrant democracies. We are still some way from finalizing the process of transformation within the OSCE area itself — media freedom is in places restricted and civil society hampered, while the vital contribution of women is not always acknowledged or fully integrated into policy-making.

However, while the OSCE continues to promote its vision of a Europe whole and free and at peace with itself, it can share its experience with Egypt and Tunisia — both formal partner countries of the OSCE. We can offer support as a part of broader team of institutions, including the UN, the EU, the Council of Europe, and alongside the bilateral efforts of others.

The Vilnius seminar was the second in the OSCE Talks series, which aims to bring together leading academics and experts to enrich our policy thinking, and to encourage the active interest and participation of young people in discussions on the primary security challenges we face. The OSCE prides itself on being a laboratory of ideas for its participating States and partners, and seminars — and publications — like this help to bring fresh and invigorating perspectives to our work.

Marc Perrin de Brichambaut is the Secretary General of the OSCE

Welcome address by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Ažubalis

Mr. Secretary General, Marc Perrin de Brichambaut,
Director Vilpišauskas
Excellences,
Distinguished Panelists
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very pleased to see so many of you here at this "OSCE Talks" seminar.

This is the second of the series. It is a new initiative by the OSCE, which brings leading experts, students, journalists and others together to explore current issues. We trust you will learn and benefit from the talks.

We also want to hear your ideas. We are open to the views of experts, bright students, NGOs and the public. That is part of the transparency the OSCE promotes in open public discourse.

The Lithuanian Chairmanship has almost reached the famous "100 Days" milestone. In the course of this time I have travelled to New York, Washington, Moscow, Brussels and many other cities to discuss and begin implementing our programme for 2011.

I have visited some of the most complicated regions where protracted conflicts have stubbornly defied resolution, Moldova and the South Caucasus. In addition, I travelled to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to meet government leaders, NGOs, minority representatives and media representatives, among others.

My Vice Minister and Secretary General de Brichambaut have been to Albania to work with our EU and US partners to calm the political situation there.

In my travels throughout the OSCE region I have participated in some 120 official meetings and diplomatic discussions, and of course have been to Vienna to present the Chair's views to the Permanent Council.

In these three months, and throughout my travels, one salient point has been clear at every stop:

Euro-Atlantic security and Eurasian security must be viewed as indivisible and include all three dimensions of security.

This reality has evolved steadily over the years since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. But for years — let us be honest — there has been an underlying sense that the OSCE area is divided between "East of Vienna" and "West of Vienna."

Most recently at the Astana Summit in December 2010, however, we have committed ourselves to establishing a single security community, across the entire Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic space, indivisible, interlinked, through all dimensions of the OSCE — the politico-military, economic and environmental and in the human dimension.

In the OSCE, security is bound up in our respect for the dignity of each individual, and the acceptance of differences in our diverse and rich cultures.

Our communities are safest when human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are upheld. When those rights and freedoms are violated, we are at risk.

During my visit to Kyrgystan and Osh Province, where hundreds of lives were lost last year, it was

evident that respect for the rights of ethnic communities is necessary for the security, not only of the people directly concerned, but for society at large, as well as the state.

And in the case of the tragedy in Osh Province this affected neighbouring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as well.

The role of the OSCE in these circumstances is to restore trust between communities and ensure that stability and the respect for rights is restored and preserved. We, as the Chairmanship, are acting to promote the Community Security Initiative in Kyrgyzstan as a practical process to begin rebuilding confidence between the communities.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Another guarantee for our security is found in the freedom to express ourselves, not just in words, but in actions. In this regard we must always try to preserve and improve our individual electoral processes. We must guarantee free assembly, and equal and free access to the media.

I am concerned with current tendencies in Moscow and Baku. We must ensure the freedom to speak out without fear of injury, imprisonment or even death. These are guarantees which must be preserved and improved throughout our OSCE area, with no regard to East or West.

Some of the greatest threats to us as individuals as well as collectively are transnational in nature. These include terrorism and international criminal activities including the trafficking of people, weapons, and drugs.

Looking ahead, I will be travelling soon to Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. There I will promote greater co-ordination, communication and co-operation in the region to establish more effective border management to combat the threats coming out of Afghanistan.

The Lithuanian Chairmanship has chosen to begin the post-Astana process of building this inclusive security community by addressing several specific challenges identified at Astana. These include, among others:

- protracted conflicts over borders and territory;
- transnational threats — where co-operation and openness among participating States is essential if we are to find solutions;
- energy security — which, in light of the recent catastrophe in Japan, must include nuclear security;
- cyber-security — where the issues overarch borders, where balance must be obtained between freedom of access to information and responsibility in its use;
- human rights security — personal, media, institutional, civil society.

By 6 and 7 December I look to participating States to reach firm conclusions in all of these areas at the Vilnius Ministerial Council.

Much of the work the Chairmanship has focused on during its first 100 days has involved these very things.

Immediately the situation in Belarus comes to mind.

As time passes I see Belarus tending to go more and more into self-isolation. This affects not just the leadership, but also the people. As a neighbour watching this, it hurts.

We ask again and again that Belarus reconsider. It refuses. It is regrettable that the authorities there continue to refuse the presence of the OSCE in Minsk. But as Chairperson I will continue to support efforts to protect human rights in Belarus. I will encourage the work of NGOs inside and outside the country, and ensure, though the use of ODIHR observers, that trials are properly monitored.

As OSCE Chair I have devoted a great deal of time and energy on the protracted conflicts in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh and in the South Caucasus.

This is a long and complex process. With the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group we need to focus on

concrete confidence-building steps, such as the removal of snipers from along the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh. It requires overcoming years of negative historical experience and suspicions. It is normal to encounter resistance to change, particularly when it threatens the status quo power structures. When you are in the middle of the process it seems to be going nowhere.

We know from experience, however, that to build our common security community, it is necessary to develop practical processes and apply concrete measures.

It is encouraging, when working on disputes such as prolonged conflicts, which seem to defy solution, to recall some of the OSCE success stories — Croatia and Serbia come immediately to mind. Two countries, two ethnic groups, only recently at war, now progressing side by side toward stable societies based on democratic rule of law structures and principles.

We also need to remind ourselves of the significant progress made throughout the OSCE participating States on issues such as media freedom, gender equality, NGO development and many other so-called "soft security issues", as well as on co-operation on improved border management and fighting international crime.

There are times, and events, however, which catch us up short, and remind us that we do not have limitless time to deal with problems. They remind us of the need to take more decisive action. Events in North Africa, Middle East and Japan are such a case.

As an experienced partner OSCE has an obligation to offer advice and to share our best practices as they are appropriate.

Co-ordinating efforts under the UN umbrella, which I discussed with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, is the most effective approach to providing assistance. The OSCE has a role to play.

In ten days I and a representative from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights will travel to Tunis to explore ways the OSCE can support our partner.

The OSCE can offer practical experience in institution building and managing electoral processes in a society in transition.

The natural catastrophe in Japan also reminds us of the continual need for our participating States to share best practices on crisis management and to work to apply the highest standards for nuclear safety throughout the OSCE region.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Building our common security community is a task which will go well beyond this Chairmanship. Out task is to establish a solid foundation. We are building on the commitments reconfirmed at Astana. I expect to document concrete achievements at the Vilnius Ministerial in December. We look to see the work we have begun to be continued and developed further by succeeding Chairmanships.

Keynote address by H.E. President Valdas Adamkus

Director Vilpišauskas,
Excellences,
Distinguished Panelists
Ladies and Gentlemen,

In March 2007 I addressed the OSCE in Vienna and expounded upon the vision of "a Europe whole, free and at peace with itself." In my remarks I stressed that the vision, as attractive as it was, had not been yet been realized.

How far have we been able to develop that idea of an all-encompassing, all embracing security community? How far have we come?

What obstacles have gotten in our way? How do we proceed today?

In March 2007 I also strongly advocated the idea that Lithuania should be given the privilege and the challenge to serve as the Chairmanship.

Lithuania, I contended, possessed unusual qualities which qualified it for the tasks it would face.

Having regained its independence, and re-established itself in the community of nations, Lithuania had transformed its system and its institutions, steps which in themselves contributed to a stronger European security community.

Located literally at the centre of Europe, Lithuania had become a member of the Western democratic system. It had a strong and determined independent tradition. It represented through its experience and success an example of the change that had occurred in Europe, and could contribute to building a European security community, "whole and free".

The vision of a "Europe whole and free and at peace with itself" was of a community in which all OSCE participating States, regardless of size or geography, belong as fully equal members of a community which accepted the principles of a common security realm.

At the same time this community could not maintain Cold War differentiation or divisions. Rather it should incorporate the whole of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security areas.

The idea obviously inspired many leaders and a great many people to the East of us as the events of the "Orange" and "Rose" Revolutions made clear.

With great anticipation we watched the demonstrations and the actions by those two peoples expressing their desires for transparent, democratic, rule of law-based societies. Success in their endeavours would mean the expansion of the concept, and reality, of Euro-Atlantic security as a part of the developing free, whole Europe.

When the dispute over the Ukrainian elections arose, I together with then-OSCE Secretary General Jan Kubiš, EU Special Representative Javier Solana and Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski mediated the situation.

The OSCE and EU were decisive in their intervention, based on the findings of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, to challenge widespread voter fraud, help prevent violence and create the conditions for new, fair elections.

I also had the opportunity to work with other democratic leaders to provide support and courage to the leaders of the Rose Revolution in Georgia. We promoted the fight against corruption,

supported democratic institution building and worked through the then-OSCE Special Representative for the Media, Miklós Haraszti, to promote the development of a free and effective media.

But in the end things did not develop as we had hoped.

Why? What went wrong?

First and foremost, I believe as a personal opinion, we in the West, perhaps most of all in the EU, did not maintain sufficiently energetic support for the revolutions' leaders to carry them through the difficulties of transition from former Soviet-style systems to modern, transparent, rule of law-based democracies.

After the first flush of popular expressions of enthusiasm and support, Western leaders and institutions, and perhaps most of all the Western public, demonstrated, sometimes subtly, sometimes starkly, their reluctance to quickly draw Ukraine and Georgia into their midst. Perhaps it was due to so-called EU "enlargement fatigue"; certainly it had to do with the fact that the two Eastern societies did not match many Western institutional and societal standards with respect to democracy, institutional structures and rule of law.

It is my perception that at critical moments the leaders of the Orange and Rose revolutions showed themselves to be somewhat unsure and untested. They appeared to look in vain for the guidance and the tools they needed to help meet the critical challenges, both internal as well as international, that lay in front of them.

I must admit that I am still disappointed by the failure of the Orange and Rose revolutions. But I am not wholly discouraged.

A good idea, a grand vision, whose time has come, will persist. I believe that is still possible, if under altered circumstances.

The concept of the common security community, to which all OSCE participating States committed themselves at Astana, reaffirms the vision of a Europe whole and free, with a broad consensual level of support which was not so explicitly evident in earlier years.

The vision is alive.

But I am concerned that the high goals proclaimed at Astana might be undercut by old practices.

The threat of force and the use of force continue to lurk in the background, particularly in the sensitive South Caucuses region. I question the wisdom of introducing modern Mistral naval craft into the area. I am concerned that neither side is prepared to withdraw snipers from the contact line in Nagorno-Karabakh, despite the wise and persistent urging of mediators and the Chairperson-in-Office.

I witness the blunt violation of human rights in Belarus, and in the Osh district of Kyrgyzstan, and I ask where the Astana commitment is.

At the same time, I am encouraged that it is Lithuania, through its Chairmanship, which has taken up several main themes from the Astana Conference and is working deliberately to promote reform and change in Belarus, and by encouraging mediation and active negotiations in the areas of protracted conflicts.

I am encouraged and pleased that it is Lithuania's Chairmanship which has taken up several main themes from Astana to build toward the concept of a common security community.

As Minister Ažubalis stated earlier today, it is essential that we pursue the resolution of protracted conflicts;

That we co-operate and co-ordinate our efforts to address transnational threats;

And that first and foremost we protect human rights, strengthen democratic institutions and ensure the electoral process and media freedom.

All of these pose challenges to security and freedom if they remain unaddressed, not just for specific states but for the entire Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region. Security must be indivisible by geography and across all dimensions of society if it is to be true security.

As I look at Europe, and I look farther afield, I am struck that events in North Africa, the Middle East and even Japan have a message — and a warning — for us.

Events in Japan have once again demonstrated that our efforts cannot only be directed at political and societal problems. We must work together to protect ourselves from natural calamities, and provide strong, meaningful environmental safety and security. Environmental threats know no boundaries, no barriers. They affect us all, and call us to establish the highest level of environmental safety to preserve the security of our very lives and society.

For years it was argued that the conditions in the Arab world were different than in Europe — Eastern Europe in particular. It has long been argued that among Arab peoples there was an acceptance of strong central leadership and that there was no great stirring for democracy among the people.

No one can credibly argue that about the Arab states today.

And what about the OSCE region?

In our realm I do not foresee North African-Middle Eastern circumstances arising.

I do sense, however, the same strong stirrings for greater expressions of human rights, adherence to the rule of law, for pluralistic society, media freedom and opportunities for free expression, whether on the Internet, Facebook and Twitter or through "old-fashioned" means of public assembly, the traditional media and the electoral process.

And, as I indicated before, I sense the danger that some still seek to maintain "security" by maintaining control through force, both within their own states and with respect to their neighbours.

Today there is a serious need for democratic organizations, institutions and governments, in the EU, OSCE, NATO, Council of Europe, to work closely with the governments and leaders of societies seeking to undergo change, to support transition without upheaval or violence.

The tools, the systems, the experience is there in abundance to be shared. It is a delicate and intricate process. It requires strong adherence to principles, but also careful listening to those undergoing the change. Our Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security, our European security and freedom depend on it.

Can we meet that challenge?

Euro-Atlantic security: from institution-building to problem-solving

by Oksana Antonenko

This paper addresses four issues related to the current Euro-Atlantic security debate. Firstly, it traces the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security order since the end of the Cold War. Secondly, it examines the key threats and challenges as well as other areas on the Euro-Atlantic security agenda today. Thirdly, it assesses the role of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic security order. And finally it concludes with an assessment of the implications that these trends have for the OSCE, both at present and in the future.

The evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security order

Over the past two decades since the end of the Cold War, trends within the Euro-Atlantic security order have undergone a profound evolution. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the chaos related to the first wave of regional conflicts — from the Balkans to the Caucasus — the main strategic project for the region was enlargement. It took almost a decade for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to take their rightful place within the Euro-Atlantic family through their membership of the EU and NATO. Unfortunately enlargement was conceived and implemented without offering Russia — which suffered major shock following the collapse of its centuries-old empire — any significant incentives and reassurances that it too could one day integrate into a new Euro-Atlantic system provided that it implemented political, economic and military reforms to make it compatible with other members.

As a result the period of Europe's unification was succeeded by years of divisions and geopolitical competition in which Russia, feeling isolated and marginalized, reasserted its dominant influence in the post-Soviet region, while the West — led by the Bush Administration's 'democracy promotion' initiative — tried to assert its own vision for the region, supporting revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.

The war in Georgia in August 2008 and the global financial crisis that followed marked the end of the era of Eurasian geopolitics and opened a new chapter in which a multi-polar Europe — with the EU, the US and Russia all promoting their own vision to the wider region — operated in what could be called a 'non-polar Euro-Atlantic strategic order'. The processes of EU and NATO enlargement have been put on hold, at least for the foreseeable future; the EU and Russia both suffered major economic shocks and have become much more inward looking with little appetite for power projection. The US under President Obama has shifted focus from Europe to the Middle East and Afghanistan and NATO. Despite the successful adoption of the new strategic concept in Lisbon in 2010, NATO continues to struggle with uncertainties over its mission, resources and credibility not only among outsiders, but also amongst its own members. The wave of popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 has consolidated the trend, which started already in 2009, under which the Eastern focus of Euro-Atlantic policy has shifted elsewhere. The lack of progress in political reforms among most Eastern states, with the possible exception of Moldova, has only helped to reinforce 'Eastern fatigue', a consequence unavoidable after years of engagement.

Given this new reality, the role of institutions in the Euro-Atlantic security order has become ambiguous at best. This was very clearly demonstrated in 2009-2010 when the wider Euro-Atlantic community, which in my definition includes all OSCE participating States, engaged in a new wave of strategic debates over the regional security architecture. This was triggered by Russian President

Dmitry Medvedev's proposals for a new Euro-Atlantic security treaty. While the initiative, which was addressed through discussions under the OSCE Corfu Process, was met with interest and triggered debate on how to foster a new level of co-operation with Russia on European and Eurasian security matters, there has of yet been no appetite to engage in the reform of the existing institutions. At the same time NATO also felt that it needed a new strategic concept in order to revitalize the organization, while the EU has adopted the Lisbon Treaty and has engaged in the lengthy reform of its internal institutions — including the creation of the External Action Service under the leadership of the newly appointed High Representative for foreign and security policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton. The OSCE, the only comprehensive regional security institution with members across Europe, North America, the Caucasus and Central Asia, held its first summit in over 10 years in December 2010.

I would argue that none of these institutional reforms have so far clearly resulted in strengthening their capacity to deal with regional security challenges. And more importantly they have not gone far enough to begin eroding barriers (which remain considerable) to open the way for a more pragmatic cross-institutional co-operation in dealing with these challenges. In the current era of austerity, such pragmatic interaction is the central prerequisite for creating a Euro-Atlantic security community, as defined at the OSCE summit in Astana, capable of securing the region itself from old, current and future threats.

Euro-Atlantic security agenda
Institutional weaknesses have presented themselves at a time of growing uncertainty within the wider Euro-Atlantic space. The global financial crisis, consolidation of authoritarian regimes in the East, unresolved protracted conflicts in and around Europe, violence in the Middle East and the emergence of new threats such as environmental, cyber and energy security — these are all important factors contributing to a growing feeling of uncertainty and anxiety that people and elites in the Euro-Atlantic region feel about the security environment and the region's capacity to tackle old and new threats effectively and timely.

In essence, the Euro-Atlantic security agenda could be divided into three layers. The first is strategic and it deals with the region's development, cohesion and its relationship with the outside world. Here the fundamental questions and uncertainties relate to the future role of the US in European security, Russia's future evolution and its policies within the Euro-Atlantic space, ways to preserve the EU's transformative influence in the neighbourhood without backing it up with a membership perspective in the short to medium term, relations between the Euro-Atlantic community and other rising powers like China, and the impact of the recent crisis on EU integration not only in the economic but in the security sphere as well. The crisis in the Middle East has added a new strategic uncertainty over the nature of future regimes in North Africa and the Middle East, and their relations with Israel and other regional powers like Turkey. The crisis also offers perhaps an opportunity for the Euro-Atlantic community to reshape the security outlook in its southern periphery.

The second layer is regional, which includes threats and challenges within Europe and in its immediate periphery that are expected to be addressed primarily or even solely through Euro-Atlantic security mechanisms or by its individual states or ad hoc coalitions. Here the key challenges relate to regional conflicts including the resolution of existing ones, from Cyprus to Transdniestria, avoiding escalation of existing conflicts — like Nagorno-Karabakh — and preventing the emergence of new conflicts — e.g. over water resources in Central Asia. The August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia sent shockwaves throughout the Euro-Atlantic community, illustrating the weaknesses of regional institutions and underscoring the urgent need for a new dialogue between East and West on how to develop trust and confidence in order to solve conflicts peacefully. The war has left a negative impact on the South Caucasus by exacerbating divisions, creating a new humanitarian disaster with thousands of displaced persons and establishing a dangerous precedent under which the escalation of a protracted conflict has been amplified by wider regional and geopolitical tensions — such as Russian-NATO tensions over enlargement — and resulted in a major inter-state military conflict of a kind which Europe has not seen since the Balkan wars of 15 years ago. However, the fact that the August war was quickly followed by the global financial crisis and the new US administration's loss of focus on Europe has meant that despite its degraded security — further reinforced

by the failure of the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process and the increasingly precarious cease-fire regime in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan — the scale of international engagement in the South Caucasus has declined. The EU, which stepped up its commitment to the region through its mediation of the August 2008 ceasefire in Georgia and the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, as well as through the inclusion of all three South Caucasus states in the Eastern Partnership, is likely to downgrade its own engagement as it faces internal financial and political tensions. This is further reinforced by its need to balance its interests and commitments in the East with increased needs in the South following the Arab Spring. In the absence of the EU, other institutions face challenges as the OSCE's role is hampered by the fact that all sides in the regional conflicts are now among its participating States (failure to produce agreement on the framework for action for enhancing the OSCE's capacity to deal with conflicts at the Astana summit is one illustration of this dilemma) and NATO's role in the South Caucasus remains hampered by continuing mistrust in NATO-Russia relations — the latter would see any NATO engagement with protracted conflicts as provocative.

The third level of the regional security agenda is local — often defined as human security — which is focused on the rights and vulnerabilities of ordinary citizens, including economic, political, environmental and public health issues. For many years human security issues have been excluded from the traditional Euro-Atlantic security agenda. But today they are becoming increasingly important as the majority of citizens within EU states perceive contemporary security challenges to include migration, organized crime, public health and environmental issues. While national defence budgets within the EU states continue to decline in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the human security agenda, on the contrary, attracts more investment and resources. Unfortunately, just as in the case of regional security, particularly regional conflicts, human security challenges are particularly acute in countries which remain outside of EU and NATO integration, including those in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as in Mediterranean states.

In an era of economic globalization and technological advances (including the Internet and social networking sites, which have proven capable of mobilizing populations), and in the context of the EU's liberalized internal border regime, the three levels of security concerns are increasingly interconnected and thus require comprehensive solutions. However, regional security institutions remain divided by institutional, political and resource constraints. Two of the most prominent institutions (NATO and the EU) have not established formal ties owing to unresolved tensions between Turkey and Cyprus (now an EU member). The EU and the OSCE while maintaining formal links — and the EU states providing a large share of resources for the OSCE — have emerged as competitors on issues like energy security and increasingly even on the protracted conflicts (Russia's veto has limited the OSCE role in Georgia's conflicts, while some members of the OSCE Minsk Group have blocked the EU from a formal role in facilitating the peace process on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict). While ad hoc arrangements have been found — like the Geneva talks on post-August war issues co-chaired formally by the EU, the OSCE and the UN, or co-operation between the same three on the crisis in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 — such initiatives have so far not gained institutional merit in overcoming 'institutional tribalism' within the Euro-Atlantic security space.

Such institutional divisions — coupled with persisting geopolitical rivalries from the past decade — are particularly visible in post-Soviet Eurasia where a pragmatic and a sustainable *modus vivendi* between Russia and Western players — be they institutions or individual countries — has not yet been found. While some positive signs have clearly emerged in the past two years following the US-Russian 'reset' — these include US-Russian co-operation on the crisis in Kyrgyzstan, a more effective co-operation between all three Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, and EU-Russian discussions on the Transdniestria conflict — fundamental mistrust and anxieties on both sides have not been overcome.

Russia in Euro-Atlantic security

Russia's role in Euro-Atlantic security is one of the central strategic questions for the region to which no satisfactory answer has been found since the end of the Cold War. For the past twenty years Russia was seen as both part of the problem and part of the solution for Euro-Atlantic

security. On the one hand, Russia's own evolution, which failed to produce a democratic state and a diversified economy based on the rule of law, has made it difficult to envision a path towards Russia's integration within the Euro-Atlantic security order, which after the end of the Cold war evolved along the path of EU and NATO enlargement. On the other hand, divisions among Europeans, which are exacerbated by unresolved historical legacies in relations between Russia and its neighbours, have prevented regional organizations from developing a clear strategic vision on ways to bring Russia closer into a common normative framework and a genuine, not declaratory, strategic partnership. As a result of continuing uncertainty in Russian-Western relations, which has had the effect of perpetuating mistrust and prompting geopolitical rivalries, many regional security issues which require Russia's constructive engagement or even active co-operation have not been settled. These include protracted conflicts in the post-Soviet area and energy security challenges which have been defined in zero-sum terms, thus complicating the implementation of many projects, like Nabucco.

The August 2008 war represented the lowest point in relations between Russia and Western democracies, as well as many of its own neighbours which, although critical of Georgia's reckless actions in South Ossetia. were nonetheless horrified at the sight of Russia's tanks crossing into the territory of the neighbouring state and then its recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, relations between Russia and the West, as well as with its neighbours, have since taken a new direction, opening a window of opportunity to revisit the most important unresolved legacy of the Cold War in Europe, Russia's place in the Euro-Atlantic security order.

There are a number of reasons why this window of opportunity is unique and real and the main reasons for it are changes in Russia itself, combined with changes in the US and globally. The 2008-2009 financial crisis had a major impact on Russia, which experienced the sharpest economic decline among developed and leading developing states. The crisis not only helped to burst Russia's strategic bubble built around its self-perception as a rising regional power capable — financially, politically and militarily — of pursuing unilateral policies in the Euro-Atlantic region that go against the interests of most of its members, including the most important ones. The war in Georgia also highlighted major limitations to Russia's defence capabilities. Furthermore, the economic crisis diminished resources and Russia's domestic debates on modernization have exposed the reality that the country needs investment, technologies and support from the most developed Western economies. Politically, Medvedev's presidency, although often downplayed in terms of his domestic power base, has made progress in its foreign policy agenda by embracing the Obama administration's offer of transforming the atmosphere and trust in bilateral relations — which has delivered agreement on the START treaty, sanctions on Iran and Russia's recent abstention on the Libya resolution at the UN. Under Medvedev's presidency, Russia has also continued and expanded its efforts to improve relations with neighbours, including Polish-Russian rapprochement, the resolution of a border dispute with Norway and dramatic improvement in relations with Ukraine. Finally, Medvedev has guided Russia's foreign policy beyond Vladimir Putin's focus on the post-Soviet space towards a new post-Soviet paradigm with much less attention devoted to CIS states and new dialogue and co-operation with the West on regional issues in Eurasia. As mentioned above, co-operation is evident within the Minsk Group and on Kyrgyzstan. Finally, Medvedev tried to transform relations with NATO by attending the summit in Lisbon and agreeing on co-operation with the Alliance on the European Missile Defence System, which prior to Obama's presidency was among the most serious sources of tensions in US-Russian relations. These changes are not motivated only by Medvedev's assumption that improved political relations could produce economic benefits, including Western investment and support for Russia's WTO membership, but also by increasing anxiety among the Russian elite of the rapid growth of China following the global financial crisis. Finally, Russia and the West now face many more common threats and challenges together with more limited resources. These challenges include the future of Afghanistan, organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as environmental and cyber security threats.

While these positive trends are encouraging, there still exist many uncertainties connected to Russia's future and its policies. The most serious impediment is the lack of a meaningful process towards a more open democratic society inside Russia. Secondly, the uncertainty over the power succession in Russia in 2012 introduces a great deal of caution in Western responses to Russia's

new opening on foreign policy. And finally the existence of difficult and divisive issues — key among them being the legacies of the August 2008 war — makes it difficult to foster unity within the Western part of the Euro-Atlantic community in support of a fundamental rethink of strategy towards Russia. At present this strategy remains incremental and offers no long-term vision for Russia's integration either with NATO or with the EU. On the other side, in Russia itself, the frustration and scepticism towards Europe is also increasing, with more and more voices talking about the need to develop closer ties with Asia including in the economic and energy sphere as well as on security. It is likely that in the future the US-Russian strategic dialogue on North East Asia could emerge as more important than a US-Russian strategic dialogue on European security matters.

Implications for the OSCE

The key question for this paper now is what do all these trends in Euro-Atlantic security mean for the OSCE? How does the OSCE add value in an age of austerity? Why should the OSCE remain the organization of choice for key players in the Euro-Atlantic area for dealing with regional security issues? Why should OSCE States who are outside of other institutional frameworks like NATO or the EU trust the OSCE to support their domestic transformations, conflict resolution and efforts to neutralize the transnational challenges that they face? None of these questions have easy answers. Moreover, it is also important to recognize that of all regional institutions, the OSCE has perhaps had the most difficult time in defending its credibility and reinventing its identity in the last decade.

Having said that, the OSCE remains a unique instrument within the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasia region which is comprehensive both in participation and in the range of issues within its mandate. While sceptics view it as a problem, there is a compelling rationale to see it as a strength and a guarantee that as long as EU and NATO enlargement remains on hold, the OSCE will remain an indispensible instrument in shaping the post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic security community as it was envisioned by the original godfathers of the post-Cold War era — stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok and focused around a fundamental set of values and principles which transcend political, cultural and economic differences for the good of individual citizens. Of all regional actors, the OSCE most closely resembles the type of common Euro-Atlantic security community that is now increasingly viewed as the future of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security order.

While the OSCE is not about to send the signal of a "mission accomplished" and dissolve itself, it does have to transform itself in order to regain credibility, effectiveness and trust amongst its participating States. For this, the organization should agree on key priorities (and its comparative advantages), to develop a viable strategy for encouraging incremental but real political change in Eurasia, build strong bridges to other security institutions, and sharpen its instruments for dealing with old and new security threats. Many of these ideas have already been identified in a framework for action that failed to win consensus at the Astana summit. Yet it is encouraging that many aspects of the framework for action are still under intense discussion within the OSCE and are expected to be resolved though other less politicized mechanisms than the summit.

Let me in conclusion suggest some of my own ideas for addressing these four tasks to strengthen the OSCE. One of the key priorities for the OSCE is **conflict prevention**. However, the key question for the OSCE is whether it has the institutional capacity to analyse, inform and act to prevent conflicts in Eurasia (how best to translate early warning into early action on conflicts). This is particularly important in case of the South Caucasus and might be increasingly important for Central Asia.

The OSCE could also further enhance its role by focusing greater attention on the human dimension or the concept of **human security**. OSCE states should focus attention on non-traditional threats such as the spread of drugs, organized crime or man-made disasters. Human security offers a different lens through which to understand some of the key components of European security. Whilst divisive issues resting on geopolitical competition in Eurasia — such as hard security or energy — harmed the institutional capacity of the OSCE, focusing greater attention on the human security dimension of unresolved conflicts can bridge differences.

The key question is how the OSCE can promote standards of democracy and human rights given the inclusion of authoritarian states within the organization. The litmus test of good democratic governance may need to go further than election monitoring and instead focus on development of civil

society and freedom of media, particularly in the context of new media — the Internet and social media — as well as on education and development of a middle class in transition countries.

Following the end of the Cold War, the proliferation and fragmentation of security organizations with different geographical memberships and different tasks pose a major challenge to the OSCE. In order to revitalize itself, the OSCE needs to be able to demonstrate that it has a comparative advantage over other security organizations. This can be done for example through **energy security.** Whilst energy security is often framed in geopolitical terms, e.g. NATO and EU concerns over how to protect security of oil supplies, the OSCE could develop dialogue on the complementarity of strategic energy projects, to combat climate change through energy efficiency and to promote structural reforms among suppliers, who are excessively dependent on oil rents. The OSCE could focus greater attention on issues related to energy sector development — such as water management in Central Asia or the future of nuclear power in Europe and Eurasia.

The OSCE could reinvigorate its role as a **platform for discussion** of strategic, regional and local security issues at the level of different national and trans-national actors. At the time of persisting — and in some cases increasing — institutional divisions, the OSCE should offer its role as a bridge between various actors including not only the EU and NATO, but also the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. It should develop a similar cross-institutional strategy for conflict prevention involving all regional institutions, as the EU and NATO once did under the Berlin-plus package of agreements with regard to peacekeeping and peace support operations. The OSCE and the EU should also develop a clear strategy to ensure that their civilian crisis-response instruments are complementary and avoid duplication.

At a time when the OSCE's image as norm setter has been to some extent eroded through the Organization's rapid expansion, it needs to find a new paradigm which increases its role as a regional security actor. Such a paradigm cannot be found if the Organization constantly talks about institutional reforms, thus only increasing the perception of its ineffectiveness and divisions. The OSCE of the future should assume the role of enabler — through strategic dialogue, co-ordination and extensive membership — to solve problems in the Euro-Atlantic community no matter how strategic or how local they are. The OSCE needs to demonstrate some tangible successes as a problem solver, and do it soon, or risk falling even further down the list of priorities at a time of declining resources and growing frustration with all institutions among the elites and publics of OSCE participating States.

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A Euro-Atlantic security community for the 21st century

By Matthew Rojansky

There is a growing chorus of experts and policy-makers calling on governments to establish and promote what has been termed a "Euro-Atlantic security community." Proponents of the concept differ in their precise definition, but almost all are motivated by a shared set of concerns. They recognize that the states of North America, Europe and Eurasia depend on one another for security, economic prosperity and human development in an increasingly interconnected region and world. Yet these same states have not always acted to promote their shared interests as a security community, at the same time that they have periodically convened to reaffirm their best intentions.

In fact, a security community in the Euro-Atlantic space can be said to exist, based on the fact that states share basic interests, have compatible values, and frequently undertake co-ordinated actions. However, this community is currently weakened by the conduct of some states in opposition to agreed common principles, the persistence of deep historical cleavages and protracted conflicts within the region, and the inadequacy of the institutions and mechanisms at the centre of the community to deal with the challenges members face. To repair this situation, the states of the Euro-Atlantic security community must revitalize its institutional foundations and update its core principles to adapt to the shared security challenges of the 21st century.

What is the Euro-Atlantic security community?

Among the most prominent groups that have taken up the quest to define the security community in the Euro-Atlantic space is the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI), co-chaired by former US Senator Sam Nunn, former German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, and former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, with a Commission consisting of nearly two dozen former senior officials from North America, Europe and Russia, as well as a diverse group of supporting experts.[1] In its framing document, the EASI Commission describes the goal of a Euro-Atlantic security community as follows:

> By a Euro-Atlantic security community we mean an inclusive, undivided security space free of opposing blocs and gray areas. Within this space disputes would be expected to be resolved exclusively by diplomatic, legal or other non-violent means, without recourse to military force or the threat of its use. All would be bound together by a shared understanding of the major security challenges facing member states and ready to respond to them with effective organization and action.[2]

NATO Secretary General Rasmussen echoed this aspiration in his remarks to the 2010 NATO-Russia summit in Lisbon, in which he called for a "new era of co-operation under a common Euro-Atlantic security roof."[3] For his part, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has proposed a more formal treaty on Euro-Atlantic security that combines the collective security aspects of existing blocs

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1 The author serves as a supporting expert to the Commission's sub-group on reconciliation and protracted conflicts. EASI receives operational support from the Carnegie Endowment but its proceedings and conclusions are independent and are the sole responsibility of Commission members.

2 Sam Nunn, Wolfgang Ischinger, Igor Ivanov, and Robert Legvold, "Why Euro-Atlantic Unity Matters to World Order," Commentary, November 9, 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41902.

3 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "NATO Needs a Missile Defense," *New York Times,* October 12, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/opinion/13iht-edrasmussen.html?_r=1&ref=global.

like NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) with a broader and more inclusive conception of security reminiscent of the Helsinki Final Act, and mechanisms by which each member state can raise concerns and objections over the conduct of others.[4]

Differences in the form and details of these conceptions notwithstanding, these and other advocates of a Euro-Atlantic security community have been motivated by a similar set of concerns, which are also widely shared among governments in the region. Almost all agree 1) that disputes within the community must be resolved without the use or threat of force; 2) on the need for regional co-operation around a common purpose and set of compatible values; and 3) that members of the community must exercise sensitivity with respect to one another's security concerns in order to build the high degree of trust necessary to periodically put shared interests ahead of competition. These three principles constitute what might be termed a basic definition of the Euro-Atlantic security community.

There is, however, greater disagreement on how far the mandate or authority of a Euro-Atlantic security community should extend and on which states may actually be included or excluded. Officials and experts differ on the degree to which a security community requires the surrender of state sovereignty, as in the case of the European Union; on whether military resources should be contributed and pooled, as with NATO; and on what, if any, supranational legal authority the community should command.

To these questions I would suggest a pragmatic answer: the Euro-Atlantic region, which in its broadest sense encompasses all of Europe, Central Asia, and North America, should focus first on defining common interests and compatible values, and on solving problems. If and when the solutions require co-operation with states outside the region, as they doubtless often will, then such co-operation should be within the mandate of the security community on the basis of its unifying principles and values.

In keeping with this pragmatic spirit, we should not over-theorize the shape and structure of the security community. Let us recall that the idea of a zone of overlapping security interests in the Euro-Atlantic region is not the province of 21st century policy thinkers only. On the contrary, it is arguably as old as the history of international armed conflict in the region.

How does the Euro-Atlantic security community fall short?

Despite the extensive historical precedent and the significant existing infrastructure of the Euro-Atlantic security community, the reality is that the community has remained somewhat less than the sum of its parts. It is limited by regional states' policies and conduct that are in direct contradiction with the security community's basic premise, as well as by lingering cleavages within the community, such as between former occupying and occupied states, and between former Cold War rivals. Such cleavages have often been at least partially to blame for the outbreak of armed conflict within the Euro-Atlantic region, and for the difficulty of resolving protracted conflicts. The ability of the security community to solve these and other pressing problems is further constrained by inadequate institutions and structures, and by the lack of real consensus on mechanisms for managing fundamentally transnational challenges in the 21st century.

The behaviour of states in the Euro-Atlantic security community often fails to live up to their rhetoric about shared interests in peace and security. As blocs and individually, states continue to deploy military forces to threaten one another and to defend against perceived threats. This is most notable in the military postures of Russia and NATO in Eastern Europe, as well as in the Caucasus, where despite the end of the Cold War, there remains a "frontline" mentality, and overt planning exercises are still conducted which train forces to invade and occupy one another's territory, and to repel such invasions. Heavy troop deployments and provocative movements on both sides over months and years during the last decade certainly made war between Russia and Georgia more likely and may even have been the proximate cause of fighting in August of 2008.[5] Deployments, exercises and movements like these exacerbate a climate of tension and distrust which is fundamentally

4 "The draft of the European Security Treaty," President of Russia, November 29, 2009, http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/275.

5 Hans Mouritzen, "Wikileaks, South Ossetia and the Russian 'reset,'" Open Democracy Russia, April 4, 2011, www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/hans-mouritzen/wikileaks-south-ossetia-and-russian-reset.

incompatible with the security community's primary pillar of non-use of force to resolve international disputes.

States have undermined and constrained the security community through behaviour other than the use or threat of force as well. Energy has been used as a weapon by suppliers and transit states, while importing states have sought to build new pipelines and tap new suppliers in order to circumvent others. The gas war between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 is a notable recent case of such coercive behaviour; however, the threat of a gas-supply shut-off has loomed over Russia's relations with many other post-Soviet states.[6]

A number of states have also employed passports and citizenship to exert coercive influence on one another, either by claiming individuals living in neighbouring states and along border areas as citizens, and thus seeking to extend sovereignty beyond their borders, or by intentionally preserving the ambiguous stateless status of residents in disputed territories. Such overlapping and ambiguous citizenship and territorial claims not only facilitate confrontation between neighbouring states, but often also encourage illegal trafficking of persons and goods, since normal patterns of commerce and migration are disrupted.

The cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic security community as a single space is further disrupted by longstanding and unresolved cultural cleavages between nations, typically based on traumatic historical events in which each side portrays the other as guilty of perpetrating grave injustices. Although the post-Second World War process of European integration has facilitated reconciliation of historical grievances among the states of Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe were largely excluded from this process, and therefore the legacy of the Second World War, the Holocaust and associated crimes continues to disrupt relations between and among these states. The additional trauma of Soviet occupation between 1945 and 1989, perhaps more than any other factor, prevents formerly occupied states in Central and Eastern Europe from achieving completely normal relations with Russia, as in their eyes Moscow continues to bear responsibility for Soviet crimes.[7]

There have, of course, been some efforts at overcoming these longstanding tensions rooted in historical grievances, most notably the Russian-Polish rapprochement, begun as a scholarly commission on difficult historical issues, and reinforced by high-level political will following the Smolensk tragedy in 2010.[8] Still, a complete reconciliation between former occupiers and occupied will necessitate some soul-searching within the formerly occupied states themselves, where many citizens were also collaborators in, and beneficiaries of, Soviet domination, and this is still a long way off. As one senior official in the region told me, such a process is simply too hard as long as the individuals in question are still living.

Related to historical and cultural cleavages, and indeed often arising from them, are the protracted conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic space. The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 erupted over two breakaway Georgian provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues to claim victims each year, and to undermine further reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. Transdniestria, a breakaway region of Moldova bordering Ukraine, continues to be a major source of tension between Russia and the West, especially now that Romania, Moldova's ethnic cousin and major advocate in the West, is a member of NATO. In Cyprus and the Balkans, territorial and ethnic conflicts have been at least partially resolved through international mediation, but tensions remain between the parties to the conflict, with a real danger of drawing in neighbouring states on opposing sides.

The Euro-Atlantic security community is further limited by its own incomplete institutional development. The most obvious institutional contradictions within the Euro-Atlantic security space track with some of the historical and cultural cleavages described above. In particular, what was once the standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has transformed into a sometimes tense arms-length relationship between an expanded NATO alliance and the post-Soviet CSTO, a mutual defence pact

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6   Andrei Nesterov, "Russia-Ukraine 'Gas War' Damages Both Economies," Worldpress.org, February 20, 2009.

7   Tony Halpin, "Analysis: why the Bronze Soldier is so controversial," Times, April 27, 2007.

8   "Regarding the results of the work of the Joint Polish – Russian Group for Difficult Matters," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, June 17, 2008, www.msz.gov.pl/Regarding,the,results,of,the,of,the,work,of,the,Joint,Polish,%E2%80%93,Russian,Group,for,Difficult,Matters,session,18328.html.

of seven states dominated by Russia.[9] The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) splits regional states along yet another dividing line, excluding NATO countries and Western-leaning former Soviet republics, but including China.[10] At the same time, there are some states in the region, such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, which are not included in any formal collective security alliance, and are therefore considered security "gray zones", where external rivals compete for influence and armed conflict may be more likely.[11]

Despite the end of the Cold War superpower rivalry, Russia and the US still maintain large nuclear arsenals with the capability to completely destroy one another. In addition to direct deterrence against one another, Russia and the US have both employed the doctrine of "extended deterrence," threatening to use their nuclear weapons to retaliate against any state that might attack a non-nuclear ally. This concept serves the important purpose of reducing other states' incentives to develop or acquire nuclear weapons of their own, but it has also created a strategic posture of direct opposition between the US and its NATO allies on the one hand, and Russia and its allies on the other.

When it comes to economic and human security issues, there are a number of additional competing institutions within the Euro-Atlantic security community. The EU, though not primarily a security organization, has sought a larger role in traditional political-military security, while demonstrating its central role in European economic security (for both EU member states and non-members) during the financial crisis, when it co-ordinated bailout loans for many governments facing imminent budget shortfalls that might have led to sudden economic shocks. At the other end of the continent, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose grouping of former Soviet republics formed in 1991, has sought to manage economic relations among its member states, most notably with the implementation in 2010 of a customs union among Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, which Kyrgyzstan recently announced the intention to join as well.[12] The CIS also typically sends observer delegations to elections in the region, whose conclusions are often at odds with those of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.[13]

Simply put, the current set of institutions and tools available to the Euro-Atlantic security community are inadequate to address current challenges, with the result that too often policy responses to these challenges are formulated on an ad hoc basis, with inadequate consideration of the broader consequences and interests of the community as a whole. Recent crises in Libya, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and elsewhere have raised the important question of whether and when the security community should intervene to prevent murder and gross human rights abuses from being committed by an authoritarian regime against its own people or by one group within a country against another. In some cases, such as Libya, Euro-Atlantic states have intervened, with as yet uncertain consequences, but no standing mechanism exists within the community for taking such a decision and then managing its consequences, with the result that innocent civilians very often suffer abuse and death while states hem and haw over possible responses.

In states within the Euro-Atlantic space, such as Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, and those on its periphery, such as Afghanistan and Yemen, there is an obvious need for capacity-building operations. Enhancing the ability of governments and civil society in these countries to deliver basic services will certainly increase stability and prosperity and redound to the benefit of the states providing assistance. Yet there is at present no sufficiently effective institution to channel the resources, expertise and political will of states throughout the Euro-Atlantic region into such projects.

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9 "Basic Facts," Collective Security Treaty Organization, www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index_aengl.htm.

10 For a list of member states, see the Shanghai Cooperation Organization website, www.sectsco.org/EN.

11 In 1997, these countries, with Uzbekistan, created their own bloc for "democracy and economic development," known as GUUAM, http://www.guuam.org/general/browse.html.

12 "Executive Committee of the CIS" (In Russian), http://www.cis.minsk.by/; and "Kyrgyzstan Wants to Join Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union," RFE-RL, April 11, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyystan_wants_to_join_russia_belarus_kazakhstan_customs_union/3553439.html.

13 Compare "Elections in Kazakhstan did not meet OSCE Standards — head of observer mission," Interfax, April 4, 2011, http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=233717 with "Elections in Kazakhstan Open, Democratic, Observer Missions' heads," April 4, 2011, Itar-Tass, http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/level2.html?NewsID=16118141&PageNum=2; see also "OSCE and CIS Observers Disagree on Presidential Election in Tajikistan," New Eurasia (Blog), November 9, 2006, http://www.neweurasia.net/politics-and-society/osce-and-cis-observers-disagree-on-presidential-election-in-tajikistan/.

Current institutions also appear to be inadequate to the task of conflict resolution and prevention. Although the OSCE has established processes and working groups on several of the protracted regional conflicts, there has been insufficient flexibility and willpower to break through even the first layer of political impasse. The Minsk Process on Nagorno-Karabakh is nearing its twentieth anniversary without a resolution to the conflict, and although there has been no shooting since the 1992 ceasefire, the on-again, off-again "5+2" talks on Transdniestria have also failed to produce any agreement. The 2008 conflict over Abkhazia and South Ossetia illustrated the failure of the Euro-Atlantic security community to heed clear warning signs and make effective use of conflict prevention tools.

Finally, there is increasingly broad recognition among Euro-Atlantic states of the urgent dangers of transnational threats such as terrorism in the physical world and in cyberspace, trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings, mass migration and environmental degradation. Yet no existing regional security mechanisms have proven adequate to address these threats. Almost by definition, threats that cross national boundaries are able to exploit intra-regional cleavages and strike where the ability of the security community to respond is weakest.

How can we fix the Euro-Atlantic security community?

For the Euro-Atlantic security community to meet its full potential, a clear and decisive strategy with the backing of all states is needed. They must seek to reduce the persistent divisions that weaken the community, while establishing and strengthening institutions and mechanisms that will enable the community to deliver greater security for all its members.

Among existing security institutions in the Euro-Atlantic space, the OSCE clearly comes closest to embodying the definition of a security community as outlined above. It is fair to say that this institution must continue to play a central role, even as the broader institutional framework of the security community may undergo some revision. We must therefore strive to preserve and strengthen those features of the OSCE that have been most valuable and are most essential going forward. First, the OSCE is inclusive — no regional state is excluded from the institution, even when some states find themselves isolated economically or politically — and it has established "partnerships for co-operation" with six Mediterranean and five Asian states on the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area, as well as with Australia.[14] Second, the OSCE's core documents, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, recognize the critical linkage between the political-military, economic and human dimensions of security. And third, the OSCE enjoys unparalleled legitimacy, in part because of the universal participation of Euro-Atlantic states, but also because of its history of more than three decades of responsible and responsive diplomacy. These features will be essential to a successful Euro-Atlantic security community in the future.

In addition to the OSCE, other institutions will continue to respond to regional states' security concerns and interests, so it will be of continuing importance for the OSCE to maintain deep and productive collaboration with these other actors. In the realm of political-military security, the OSCE could play the role of facilitator to improve dialogue between the competing security blocks of NATO and the CSTO, and the role of co-ordinator with extra-regional organizations such as the SCO and ASEAN, as well as that of advocate for legal authority from the United Nations as necessary. On economic security issues, the OSCE should partner with the EU and the CIS to monitor the consequences of major economic events like the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, and to facilitate the development of region-wide responses. Finally, in addressing third dimension human security issues, which have been a core competency of the organization since the end of the Cold War, the OSCE should draw on the expertise and influence of newer intra-regional and global institutions, particularly the European Court of Human Rights, the International Criminal Court, and the UN Human Rights Council.

Within the OSCE itself there is need for reform and a renewed look at the tools it offers for addressing security challenges. For instance, taking note of escalating tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Berlin Mechanism for early warning and prevention of conflict should be activated once again,

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14 "Partners for Cooperation," OSCE, http://www.osce.org/item/44372.

to acknowledge the state of high risk, establish direct dialogue between parties and engage partici-pants in the Minsk Group at a higher level.[15] Likewise, after widespread arrests, alleged torture and politically motivated prosecutions in Belarus following that country's December presidential contest, fourteen OSCE Participating States have invoked the Moscow Mechanism, which will enable an investigation and report with or without co-operation from Minsk.[16] While neither of these measures may be sufficient by themselves to stop abuses or prevent further conflict, they will have the effect of concentrating the attention of Euro-Atlantic states on trouble spots in the region, and could provide the framework and justification for further action by the OSCE in co-ordination with the UN Security Council.

Ineffective or outdated OSCE programmes should be shuttered, while those most suited to the modern Euro-Atlantic security environment and challenges deserve stronger and more consistent application. In some cases, it will be appropriate to create new programmes under OSCE auspices. In light of the deep divisions between states in the region stemming from competing historical narra-tives, there is an urgent need for more widespread reconciliation on the model of the Russian-Polish rapprochement. A standing commission for historical reconciliation could be created under OSCE auspices, with authority to facilitate bilateral and multilateral expert dialogues, as well as to attract high-level political attention to points of agreement and enduring challenges. Of course, participants in these dialogues should come from the states party to the reconciliation process, and only with the agreement and support of their governments. At a minimum, this neutral, impartial body could maintain an archive of historical documents related to conflict and reconciliation in the Euro-Atlantic space. This resource could then be made available to the public at large, along with expert com-mentaries and guides to best practices for reconciliation.

There must also be changes, especially in some time-worn security narratives common among OSCE states, with a new consensus around the top security challenges faced by the entire Euro-Atlantic community and a movement to develop new consensus rules of the road for addressing the most difficult and novel security problems.

Because intra-regional collective security blocs like NATO and the CSTO are not likely to disap-pear in the near future, it is essential that the narrative surrounding these institutions change to reflect reality: as a community, the Euro-Atlantic states have put the prospect of Cold War style con-flict far behind us. Instead, as the US-Russia "reset" and a similar warming of ties between NATO and Russia have illustrated, broad and deep co-operation between former adversaries is possible, and it can yield tangible results. Leaders on both sides must strongly impress upon their publics the importance of recent accomplishments on nuclear co-operation, progress toward a joint missile de-fence system, and the ongoing effort in Afghanistan that depends increasingly on critical contribu-tions from both NATO members and Russia.

Euro-Atlantic states should also strive to identify a clear set of top priorities and shared security challenges that can provide a unifying agenda for the OSCE's future work. On this agenda must be peaceful resolution of the protracted conflicts in the region and an accompanying effort to fully nor-malize relations between former occupiers and occupied states, on the basis of historical reconcili-ation. Among the shared challenges that demand attention should be the increasing dependence of economies, societies and even militaries on the Internet, and their corresponding vulnerability to cy-ber terrorism. Combating more traditional forms of terrorism, along with the extremist ideologies and illicit trafficking that underpin such illegal activity, are already well established priorities for states in the region. Although the interests of states that primarily export energy resources differ from those of net energy importers, all can agree on the importance of stable, secure supplies and the impera-tive to avoid manipulation of energy markets that will disrupt confidence and cause economic harm to buyers and sellers alike.

Finally, the Euro-Atlantic security community should seek agreement on "rules of the road" to ad-dress the most difficult security questions that continue to arise, but for which current legal and political tools are inadequate. While there is some precedent in international law to determine when

15 "Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council," June 19-20, 1991, http://www.osce.org/mc/40234.

16 "EU Statement on Moscow Mechanism," OSCE Permanent Council Nr. 857, Vienna, April 7, 2011, http://www.delvie.ec.europa.eu/en/ eu_osce/eu_statements/2011/April/PC%20no.%20857%20-%20EU%20on%20Moscow%20Mechanism.pdf.

a separatist entity's declaration of independence may be recognized, practice has been inconsistent throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and globally. Until states can agree upon a consistent, reasonable formula for recognizing the autonomy or independence of an ethnic enclave, protracted separatist conflicts are unlikely to be resolved.

Similarly, states must more clearly define the circumstances under which humanitarian emergencies necessitate and justify international intervention. While few would dispute the responsibility of community members to prevent genocide, there is some debate over cases that fall short of this bright line, such as the recent NATO intervention in Libya. As natural resources, especially fossil fuels, become increasingly scarce, and the environment is increasingly polluted by industry, states will also be under greater pressure to agree on consistent principles for bearing the costs and enjoying the benefits of resource extraction. That pressure is already substantial, as illustrated by disputes among neighbouring states throughout the region over construction of new nuclear power plants and energy pipelines.

Conclusion

The challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic security community are vast. The rivalries and mistrust that divide states and blocs from one another came about over decades and even centuries of history, and they cannot be undone overnight. Institutions like the OSCE, NATO and the CSTO are complex organizations in their own right, whose structure and limitations reflect the interests and histories of the states that created them. Yet rapid technological change and globalization have ushered in a host of new security challenges.

The first step to building a Euro-Atlantic security community that works is to recognize the need for one, and leaders and experts are increasingly doing just that. The shortfalls of current security institutions and underlying tensions among states can only be addressed if leaders also recognize their own responsibility to take bold action. North America, Europe and Eurasia have come a long way since the Cold War's end, but the vision of a Euro-Atlantic space whole, free, and at peace has not yet been made real.

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Transformations of civil society
after the presidential elections in Belarus

By Victor Martinovich

Seven years ago my colleague Doctor Alexander Feduta and I issued a book devoted to Belarusian political parties and NGOs.[1] I think a good way to start my speech on post-election transformations of civil society in Belarus is to mention that Feduta — a brilliant intellectual, author of the most prominent political biography of Aleksandr Lukashenko — was imprisoned and faced criminal charges for what is recognized to be classic civic participation.[2] To put the discussion in the correct context, we should remember that the object of our talk is a country where civic action is recognized as a crime.

I will use the term "civil society" in a more broad sense than it is used in classical political theory. Not as a totality of voluntary social relationships, civic and social organizations as described by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba,[3] but as any form of social and political organization that has nothing to do with the state. I think that it is the only appropriate approach in the case of Belarus.

The easiest way to start is to provide some raw data: to tell you that seven presidential candidates of the nine who dared to participate in the elections are now under investigation and could end up with long-term prison sentences; that 600 people were arrested during the night after the elections for their determination to come to the street protests, and most of them were sentenced to fees and imprisonment; that eight civic activists, who took part in the political campaigns, have already been sentenced for up to four years of prison for what is called "participation in mass disturbances". I can add that the youngest, who was sentenced last Tuesday, is only 20 years old…

I can mention youth activist Nasta Polozhanko's recent article[4] in which she stated that her life had become "an endless observation of the arrests, searches, trials and sentences, the daily preparation of deliveries for imprisoned friends and visits to the relatives of those who have been arrested".

But what is more meaningful than narrating the ubiquity of repressions in civil society is attempting to realize how the roles of unofficial actors of public policy in Belarus have changed. According to the Ministry of Justice, in 2010 Belarus had 2,500 registered NGOs.[5] There are two facts, taken together, that help to understand what that means. First, some of the deeply politically engaged NGOs, such as Viasna or Partniorstva, have lost their registration. Second, in the year 1999 Belarus had the same number of NGOs — 2,500. That means that most politically involved NGOs have been de-legalized but replaced, so that the total number remains constant, by pro-government NGOs. On the other hand, that means that Belarusian civil society is frozen and no major changes have happened since 1999.

1 Политические партии Беларуси — необходимая часть гражданского общества: Материалы семинара/ Авт.-сост. Александр Федута, Олег Богуцкий, Виктор Мартинович. — Минск: Фонд имени Фридриха Эберта, 2003. — 113 с.

2 On 20 May 2011, Aleksandr Feduta was sentenced to two years' probation following charges of organizing and/or participating in activities breaching public order during the December 2010 election.

3 Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1963.

4 http://belaruspartizan.org/bp-forte/?page=100&backPage=13&news=79964&newsPage=0

5 http://www.minjust.by

Political scientist Vladimir Rovdo insists that since 2005, NGOs in Belarus have become one of the main political forces.[6] During the elections, only two of the nine presidential candidates represented political parties. Andrey Sannikov and Vladimir Nekliaev — two main candidates — represented the NGOs Charter 97 and Govori Pravdu respectively. The low level of activity of political parties is a result of growing distrust towards parties in Belarus. Thus, during the elections we had a campaign led by NGOs. As Rovdo insists, NGOs have their own logic, which is focused on doing projects, accounting and trying to be as far from politics as possible. A situation where the main political participation was done through NGO activity was not healthy from the very beginning.

But now, after 19 December 2010, this interplay between parties and NGOs has dramatically changed. Now neither parties nor NGOs are politically concerned, they both try to be as far from organized action as possible. Those who do not obey that rule are put under heavy pressure. Involvement in any systematized activity that has a linkage with politics is punishable after December 2010 not only for organizations but also for individuals. I can remind you of the case of Internet activist and blogger Tatjana Elovaja, who is among those who have chosen to continue political resistance even after the mass arrests. She found and uploaded to her online journal recordings of KGB radio talks from a Minsk city square on 19 December. The audiofiles appear to prove that the government was involved in provocations on the square and that those who broke the windows of the government building were agents of the KGB or militia. A couple of weeks after she did it, the KGB started the chase for her. KGB officers looked for her in Belarus, interrogating her relatives.[7]

Another aim of civil society's existence in Belarus before the election was to create a signboard of upcoming democratic changes in this country. Belarus loved to be a country that was about to change. Belarusian officials were telling Europe and the US: "democracy is a long journey, just give us time. Meanwhile, look how things are in our civil society — not bad, right?" But it appears that this aim of civil society's existence was relevant only for a short period of the so-called liberalization. Now, when Belarus is turning its face to Russia, there is no need to charm the West with the signboard of civil society. The Belarusian state simply has no need for it anymore.

Before the liberalization project started, there was another interesting and exotic excuse for parties and NGOs to exist. In the authoritarian Belarusian system they were said to be the bad guys who made the president do things he himself did not want to do. Let's say, if there was a demand from Russia for closer integration and the president did not want this integration to take place, he could always bring up opposition parties and NGOs by insisting that they would not permit him to do that. In December 2005, after Putin proposed that Belarus be territorially included in Russia as a whole or in part, Lukashenko said that Belarus would never "accede to Russia because if it does, Russia will get a new Chechnya".[8] And the reason why it would become a new Chechnya is that in Belarus there exist nationalist movements and parties that would fight for independence and people who would support them because this is such a holy fight.

Another role of civil society in very specific Belarusian conditions was to drain the protest out of society. Annual street demonstrations focused on historical and ecological issues were unable to change the foundations of the political regime, but could let some political tensions out and create an illusion of the presence of an alternative. But after 19 December this role is no longer interesting for the government. Again, the rules of play in Belarusian politics have changed dramatically.

25 March 2011 was one such annual event, focused on a prominent date in Belarusian history.[9] The organizers were firstly banned from holding a traditional demonstration on the street. They decided not to oppose the government and proposed to people that they calmly and silently come and put flowers on historical monuments. But even this was interrupted: local militia reported that a bomb had been found nearby and they could not allow the people to approach the monument. As you can see, any kind of political action, any kind of street participation, now fell outside the law.

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6   http://www.zautra.by/art.php?sn_nid=133&sn_cat=9

7   http://charter97.org/ru/news/2011/2/22/36252/

8   http://www.charter97.org/rus/news/2005/12/26/sostav

9   The Belarusian People's Republic was established on 25 March 1918.

Protest now is drained not through the simulation of political action, but through the spreading of fear among politically active people.

Together with the change of roles of Belarusian civil society comes the change of its morphology. Now there are two types of political parties, NGOs and networks that can be found in Belarus. First, those led by leaders who have publicly condemned the organizers of mass disturbances. Andrey Dmitriev from Govori Pravdy, Jaroslav Romanchuk, the presidential candidate from UCP, and Grigory Costusev, the BNF presidential candidate, were among those who were forced to stand before television cameras in prison and read text blaming Nekliaev, Sannikov and others for preparing the revolution. These people are mistrusted and they have lost their social and symbolic capital, although they are no longer in prison.

The second type is organizations led by those who decided not to co-operate with the KGB. Charter 97 is a good example. Its leaders, such as Andrey Sannikov or Dmitry Bandarenka, now are in prison, and its activists, such as Natalia Radina or Nikolaj Khalezin, are abroad, looking for political asylum, under the threat of being arrested in Belarus. This is the situation that we have: part of society has become traitors, the other part victims. Of course, these two parts hate each other and no room for consolidation or co-operation is left.

Why did it end up like this? The most obvious answer is to say that Belarusian civil society was too weak, and its weakness pre-determined the possibility for the state, government and president to take the steps that nearly killed it in December 2010. I can remind you of the words of His Excellency, the former President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, about the critical importance of improving civil society. I can add that Belarusian civil society was a post-Soviet one and had all the limitations of this which were described in an article by Oregon State University professor Sara Henderson in "Selling civil society: Western aid and the non-governmental organization sector in Russia".[10] Instead of building up horizontal connections and inspiring co-operation between people, Belarusian NGOs have acted all these years according to the logic of the Soviet nomenclature, where the aim of organization is not to achieve social goals and organize a social movement, but to build patron-client ties (and not allow outsiders to see these ties by joining the organization).

But this is only part of the problem. The most dramatic answer to the question, why did civil society allow that to happen in Belarus, lies in the field of post Machiavellism. My main thesis is that it is impossible to resist violence solely through rhetoric or scientific reflection. No word can stop the fist that flies in your face. No social movement can prevent the militia from using clubs against protestors. And if the authorities have no ethical boundaries that prevent them from using force against peaceful citizens, if they act in a Machiavellian paradigm, no NGO activity — whether effective or "nomenclature-like", can stop them.

At the end of my short report I'd like to mention that the health of civil society is usually recognized to be an internal problem of the political system to which this civil society belongs. And this approach seems to be appropriate, since it is hard to imagine a linkage between civil society, let's say in Belarus, and regional security in Eastern Europe. But as the Belarusian case demonstrates, the state of civil society can easily be converted into a bottom-up question of regional security. There is no way a nuclear power plant could be erected in a post-Chernobyl country if there were a civil society that had a chance to participate in public discussion. It is obvious that this idea is not popular with people who suffered from nuclear disaster 25 years ago. But then civil society is dead; there are simply no voices to express public concerns and to stop the state from experiments that are dangerous not only for Belarus, but for all neighbouring countries. And that means not only Belarus itself, but all of Eastern Europe, should be interested in the revival of local parties and NGOs.

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10 Henderson, Sarah L. "Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia," *Comparative Political Studies* 8.2 (2002), pp 139 – 167.

Western international broadcasting:
Cold War impact on the USSR and current challenges in Middle East crisis areas

By R. Eugene Parta

Western broadcasting during the Cold War to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a major undertaking with the intent of countering the Soviet government's information monopoly by providing alternative information. Its aim was to promote a more informed Soviet citizenry as a necessary step toward civil society and democratic development. This was done in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, which affirmed the freedom "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas…regardless of frontiers."[1]

My presentation will examine the effectiveness of this broadcasting during the Cold War period and then fast-forward to the present to assess challenges faced in attempting to replicate the Cold War experience in current Western international broadcasting to the crisis areas of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

As it is not possible to include the charts of empirical data in this paper, the interested reader is referred to two books which examine both the research methodology and findings on Cold War international broadcasting in considerably more detail than the brief summary offered here.[2]

No single measure of impact exists, but in attempting to assess how well these broadcasts achieved their goals (admittedly they were not identical for all broadcasters[3]) a number of criteria can be examined:

1. Audience size
2. Audience "quality" in political and socio-demographic terms
3. Audience motivation to seek serious information. Were the broadcasts judged to be relevant and credible?
4. Was Western broadcasting an important or marginal factor in the overall USSR media environment?
5. Did Western broadcasts influence "public opinion" in the USSR?
6. How did Soviet authorities react to the broadcasts? Were they taken seriously or safely ignored?

To shed light on these criteria, it should be mentioned that it was not possible during the Cold War to commission Soviet institutions to conduct survey research. Alternative, and unorthodox, methods

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1   http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml.

2   Parta, R. Eugene. *Discovering the Hidden Listener: An Assessment of Radio Liberty and Western Broadcasting to the USSR during the Cold War.* Hoover Press, Stanford University, California, 2007. Johnson, A. Ross & Parta, R. Eugene, Editors. Foreword by Timothy Garton Ash. *Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.* Central European University Press, Budapest, 2010.

3   While the research was conducted under the auspices of RFE/RL, most major Western broadcasters shared in the results and used it as their main source of information on their audiences in the USSR. These included: Voice of America, BBC, Deutsche Welle on a regular basis and Radio Sweden, Radio France International, Radio Vatican, Radio Canada International on an occasional basis.

had to be employed.[4] The empirical basis for the assessment given here is the more than 50,000 interviews conducted systematically with Soviet travellers temporarily outside the USSR during the period 1970-1990. The traveller survey project gathered information on Western radio listening in the context of overall media use. This unrepresentative group was modelled to project findings onto the Soviet population using a sophisticated computer simulation program developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).[5] The validity of this procedure and the relative accuracy of the findings were confirmed by studies conducted in the USSR as early as 1990 and in following years.[6]

The impact of Western radio during the Cold War
The empirical findings on the above criteria relating to impact can be summarized as follows:

1. Western radio reached large audiences during the Cold War period. During the decade from 1980 to 1990, the weekly audience in the USSR hovered around 25% of the adult population 16 years and older. Two interesting fluctuations can be noted here. From 1985 to 1986, the weekly audience estimate dropped from 26% to 19%. This was during the early Gorbachev period of *perestroika/glasnost* when Soviet media became considerably livelier and less fettered by official censorship. The second shift followed the end of the Soviet authorities' practice of jamming Radio Liberty in November 1988. Radio Liberty jumped into first place as the most heard station ahead of Voice of America (VOA), which had the largest audience up to that point. This was probably due to Radio Liberty's focus on internal Soviet affairs. Earlier it had been the most heavily jammed of all the Western stations.

2. Western radio reached a "quality" audience. Listening rates were higher among urban, educated people than in the general population. Listening rates also increased progressively with education. It was widely heard among all educated strata of the society, and members of the Communist Party were just as likely to listen as non-members, as they often needed information from Western broadcasts to be well-informed in their activities.

   Political orientation was a determinant of listening. In 1984, a typology of the urban population in the USSR in terms of attitudes toward civil liberties was developed through the MIT computer simulation along the following continuum: "Liberals" (13%), "Moderates" (29%), "Politically indifferent" (19%), "Conservatives" (28%), "Hardliners" (12%).[7] The "liberals" listened to Western broadcast at the highest rate (80%), followed by the "moderates" at 40%. "Hardliners", on the other hand, listened at a relatively low rate of 10%. The audiences of the major Western broadcasters were not identical in terms of political orientation. "Liberals" formed half the audience for Radio Liberty, the most politically engaged of the broadcasters, while "moderates" were a plurality for VOA, BBC and Deutsche Welle (DW).

   It may well be that during the pre-*glasnost* period, Western broadcasts primarily reinforced existing critical positions among the "liberals", while for the "moderates' they provided alternative and supplementary information without which a critical thought process might have been unlikely. When the "liberals" and "moderates" found common ground in the *perestroika/glasnost* period, change in the USSR became possible.

3. Serious motivations drove listening to Western radio in the USSR. About eight in ten listeners said they primarily sought uncensored news, while seven in ten indicated that they were looking

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4 The development of the methodology is traced in an article by the author to be published in 2011 in the UK on-line academic publication *Participations*. (www.participations.org). The paper is based on a presentation at a conference, "The Social Life of Methods," at Oxford University in September 2010 convened by the Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change. (CRESC).

5 See "*Discovering the Hidden Listener…*", pp. 79-82.

6 Ibid., pp 90-93.

7 Ibid. pp 30-32.

for general information not available in the controlled Soviet press.[8] Learning about the outside world also ranked high at six in ten listeners. Another important motivation was to verify whether information they received in the Soviet press was true. While entertainment ranked relatively low among the travellers surveyed, there were indications from data available after the breakup of the USSR that there was a large occasional audience for Western music among Soviet youth.[9] Motivations such as "hearing the official viewpoint" of Western governments or to "know the adversary" ranked relatively low at about one in ten listeners.

As an example, high rates of Radio Liberty listeners said they sought *samizdat* and human rights programming in addition to uncensored news and political information.[10] They were also interested in a wide range of cultural programmes unavailable in the USSR and in readings from banned books, such as those by Solzhenitsyn, Pasternak and other writers out of favour. Political analysis, especially during the *perestroika/glasnost* period, was also widely sought to add understanding and perspective to the larger amount of information that became available through the domestic media at that time.

The broadcasts were largely considered relevant by listeners, with Radio Liberty and VOA scoring the highest.[11] Radio Liberty's focus on Soviet internal affairs made it a participant in the internal debate on reform in the Soviet Union during the *perestroika* era. While both were judged to be relevant, the BBC and DW were rated somewhat lower, possibly due to the fact that their shorter daily on-air time was obliged to include a certain amount of programming on domestic British and German themes, of lesser interest to a Soviet audience.

Credibility was also rated high, with the BBC on top by a wide margin.[12] While both Radio Liberty and VOA were considered to be credible, they were also judged to be more "tendentious" than either BBC or Deutsche Welle, possibility due to the greater level of political engagement in Radio Liberty programmes, and to VOA being obliged to explain US policy.

4. Western radio was a serious player in the Soviet domestic media environment. In a 1988 study it was cited as a "main source of information on current events in the USSR" by over 40% of urban respondents.[13] This compared favourably with domestic Soviet radio, although it was understandably lower than the Soviet press and TV. It is noteworthy that Western radio listening correlated highly with "word of mouth" as an information source, indicating that information received from Western broadcasts went beyond the original recipients and was amplified conversationally throughout the wider society.

5. There is evidence that by providing information unavailable from domestic sources, Western radio played an important role in the complex process of shaping Soviet listeners' opinions on events. Included in the traveller surveys were various questions on current topics to assess the views of Soviet citizens. Analyses were conducted on attitudes toward Soviet involvement in the war in Afghanistan, the *samizdat* phenomenon, the Solidarity movement in Poland, the shooting down of Korean Air Lines flight 007 in 1983, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, *perestroika/glasnost* and a range of other topics.[14] In each of the topics studied, Western radio listeners consistently deviated from the official version of events provided by Soviet domestic media. Of course, the complex process of opinion formation does not depend on any single factor and correlation

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8   Ibid. pp 32-34.

9   Ibid., pp 69-74 and Bashkirova, Elena, "The Foreign Radio Audience in the USSR During the Cold War," in *Cold War Broadcasting…,* pp 103-120.

10 See "*Discovering the Hidden Listener*…." pp. 34-35.

11 Ibid., p. 36.

12 Ibid., p. 37.

13 Ibid., p. 42.

14 Ibid., pp.47-61 for a detailed discussion of these opinion studies.

does not prove causality, but it is clear that information provided by Western radio broadcasts was an important part of the "mix" in opinion formation in the USSR. Without alternative information available from these broadcasts it is unlikely that widespread contrary views could have developed, given the total control of the media that existed in the USSR.

   In summing up it is apparent that Western broadcasts had considerable impact in the USSR during the Cold War and played an important role in that country's evolution toward a more open society.[15]

1. Western radio drew large audiences in the USSR, as has been confirmed from internal and external data. They were a vital part of the Soviet media scene and reached the better educated and proto-democratic elements at high rates and were judged credible and relevant. Listening to Western radio correlated highly with word of mouth as an information source, amplifying these messages throughout the society.
2. Western broadcasts were clearly important in the eyes of the regime. Party and government elites were provided printed synopses. The broadcasts were widely attacked in Soviet media, and jamming and legal intimidation were employed to discourage listeners.
3. Western radio, by its presence and popularity, played a significant role in encouraging Soviet domestic media to reform and modernize, and contributed to keeping Soviet media more "honest" in their coverage of events.
4. Alternative information from Western radio broke the information monopoly of the Soviet regime and played an essential role in helping to nurture or reinforce democratic attitudes in the USSR.
5. Western broadcasts kept the hope of freedom alive and helped prepare the way for political change.

The Cold War experience and current international broadcasting to crisis areas
   In light of the important role that Western broadcasts played in helping to create a more informed Soviet public, which was a crucial component in the process of moving from a totalitarian polity to a more open and democratic society, the question has been posed if Western broadcasting can play a similar role today, especially in the troubled areas of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
   In addressing this question, it might be useful to look at some of the ways in which media use and political circumstances have evolved since the Cold War.

Cold War: Closed target societies, with total control of domestic media.
Present: Both government and private media in most areas, total control rare with a few exceptions, e.g. North Korea.

Cold War: TV, radio and press were the only media platforms.
Present: Multiple media platforms — Internet, mobile telephones, satellite TV, etc.

Cold War: Word of mouth linked to Western radio listening, amplifying it.
Present: Word of mouth now electronic with email, social networks, Twitter, Facebook, blogosphere, etc.

Cold War: Mistrust of domestic media on many sensitive topics, but more trust of foreign media on some key issues.
Present: Widespread mistrust of most official media from any source, contrasted with greater trust in peer-to-peer communication using new technologies.

Cold War: Strong motivation to use outside media sources.
Present: Less clear motivations in making media choices, with many available options.

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15 Western broadcasters drew even larger audiences in the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe and arguably exercised even greater influence. See Johnson and Parta, *Cold War Broadcasting Impact*…., pp. 142-144.

Cold War: Widespread heavy jamming hampered reception but also contributed to a "forbidden fruit" attraction of the broadcasts.
Present: Most, but not all, broadcast target areas are un-jammed, Iran being a notable exception.

Cold War: No access to domestic media outlets for international radios.
Present: Some access to domestic media outlets, but often unreliable in practice, e.g. parts of the former USSR.

Cold War: Western radio had a clearly defined niche in a limited media environment, making it easier to assess impact.
Present: More difficult to assess impact of a single medium in a highly complex media environment.

It is apparent that much has changed in terms of media use, both domestically and internationally, in the more than twenty years since the end of the Cold War.

US international broadcasting to MENA and Iran, Afghanistan and FATA Pakistan

In an attempt to address the question of the comparability of the Cold War experience to the present, I will briefly examine three areas: US broadcasting to MENA crisis areas, US broadcasting to Iran, Afghanistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Pakistan, and a case study of media use during the recent uprising in Egypt.

US international broadcasting is well represented in MENA crisis areas and in Iran and Afghanistan by a range of media outlets under different management structures:[16]

1. Alhurra Satellite TV in Arabic under Middle East Broadcasting Network (MBN)
2. Radio Sawa, a music and news station in Arabic (MBN)
3. VOA Satellite TV Persian News Network (Iran)
4. VOA (Radio Ashna) in Dari and Pashto (Afghanistan)
5. VOA (Radio Deewa) in Pashto (FATA Pakistan)
6. RFE/RL - Radio Azadi in Dari and Pashto (Afghanistan)
7. RFE/RL - Radio Mashaal in Pashto (FATA Pakistan)
8. RFE/RL - Radio Iraq al Hurr in Arabic (Iraq)
9. RFE/RL - Radio Farda, a music and news station in Persian (Iran)

Each of the above broadcast entities also has a website with news and features in the broadcast language, streaming audio, video clips and archived programming. Podcasts and RSS feeds are available and most websites have interactive chat capability.

Despite this wide range of up-to-date broadcast efforts, however, the impact of US international broadcasting has been decidedly mixed.

In MENA crisis areas of Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Iraq, US international broadcasting has high audience reach in Iraq, due to the availability of local terrestrial transmission facilities, and Bahrain.[17] In Iraq Alhurra TV has a weekly reach of 62%, Radio Sawa ca. 29% and Radio Iraq al Hurr (Radio Free Iraq) ca. 12%. In Bahrain, Alhurra reaches ca. 29% weekly and Radio Sawa 23%. The picture is quite different in Egypt and Tunisia, where Alhurra reaches ca. 8% and Radio Sawa 6% weekly. In Tunisia, Radio Sawa listening is negligible while Alhurra TV reaches 8%. Overshadowing the US broadcasting effort is Al Jazeera TV in Arabic, with a reach of 75% in Bahrain, 62% in Egypt, 61% in Tunisia and 53% in Iraq. Pan-Arab satellite TV is clearly dominant in all of these crisis areas, with the exception of Iraq, where it is still strong.

The situation in Afghanistan, FATA Pakistan and Iran is different in that pan-Arab satellite TV is not

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16 All of the US-funded media outlets are under the aegis of a US Federal Agency, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, although they have independent managements.

17 Listening data for MENA and Iran, Afghanistan and FATA Pakistan are from Broadcasting Board of Governors surveys conducted by InterMedia, 2010.

the main competition. US international broadcasting has been successful in Afghanistan, where radio is still an important platform and local transmission facilities are available. RFE/RL's Radio Azadi is a leading radio station in Afghanistan with a weekly reach of 36% in Dari and 26% in Pashto. VOA's Radio Ashna is close behind. In FATA Pakistan, VOA's Radio Deewa reaches 22% weekly while RFE/RL's Radio Mashaal, which only began broadcasting in 2010, is still building an audience at 6%. Local FM transmission facilities are available in Afghanistan while cross-border transmissions are used for FATA Pakistan.

Iran has proven to be considerably more difficult. Only VOA's Persian News Network satellite TV has reached a sizeable audience at ca. 20% weekly. RFE/RL's Radio Farda, which had a weekly reach of 15% a few years ago, is now down to 4%, due primarily to consistent jamming.

Media use during the Egyptian uprising

The 2011 Egyptian uprising has provided a type of laboratory environment in which to analyze media use, both international and domestic, in a time of crisis.

The US Broadcasting Board of Governors commissioned a telephone survey in Cairo and Alexandra in the midst of the uprising.[18] The findings were most instructive in showing how contemporary media use has dramatically evolved from the Cold War period.

Television was by far the "most-used" media platform among the respondents (overall 98% and "most-used" 86%), with the Dubai-based Al Arabiya satellite TV station (65% overall use, 44% "most-used" and 42% "most-trusted"), ranking well ahead of Egyptian TV1 (51% overall use, 29% "most-used" and 28% "most-trusted") and other international TV channels, such as Alhurra, Al Jazeera and BBC. The US-funded Alhurra reached a highly respectable 25% of the sample and 8% considered it their "most-used" source, ahead of the BBC and CNN. Al Jazeera was a special case because it was both jammed and removed from the NileSat satellite very early in the uprising. Consequently it reached only 22% of the respondents and only 4% cited it as "most-used." Its office and journalists were also attacked.

While traditional media sources, such as newspapers and radio, were consulted, they were cited as "most-used" at miniscule rates, 3% for newspapers and 2% for radio. Internet, on the other hand, was used by 33% of the respondents and "most-used" by 7%. This is a considerable figure considering that it is not readily available to all and the Egyptian authorities blocked access.

Of special note is the role played by new technologies during the uprising, both to follow news and to share news. This took a number of different forms. To follow news, email was used by 13%, news websites by 15%, messages on social networking sites such as Facebook by 17%, text messaging on mobile phones by 21%. To share news: email was used by 10%, social networking sites by 18%, text messaging by 13%, sending pictures and videos on mobile phones by 8% and sending videos/photos to news agencies by 4%.

The new technologies allowed observers and participants in the uprising to become reporters as well as organizers of the demonstrations.

Conclusions

Clearly, the role and methods of international broadcasting are rapidly evolving. In terms of summing up the new media situation in comparison with the Cold War period, the following can be noted:

1. There is still an important role for Western international broadcasting, but in a less clearly defined niche than during the Cold War. A similar impact is unlikely. The effectiveness of Western broadcasting to the USSR and other communist countries developed slowly over a long period of time, during which credibility was built. Those circumstances don't exist today.
2. The political context in MENA countries is different from that in Communist countries during the Cold War. In the late 1980s communist ideology was largely a spent force and people in the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries were looking to the West as a model for their development. In MENA today resurgent Islam is a dynamic force and anti-Western feeling is widespread.

18 Broadcasting Board of Governors, Research Memorandum IBB Office of Research, "Media Consumption during the Uprising in Egypt." February 14, 2011, Washington, DC.

3. Pan-Arab satellite TV channels play a dominant role ahead of Western broadcasters in MENA. Radio is no longer the primary platform in many areas. Satellite TV is now an essential medium for any international broadcaster.

4. Media consumption patterns have altered dramatically and new technologies require new strategies. Communication now is not "one-way" but an interactive dialogue between sender and receiver with social networks and new technologies, such as the Internet, playing a growing role. Messages can now rapidly go "viral" in the form of "many-to-many" communication.

5. The "Liberation Technology" programme co-ordinated at Stanford University (http://liberation-technology.stanford.edu/) is actively exploring this new communications phenomenon. "Liberation technology" is defined as "any form of information and communication technology that can expand political, social and economic freedom." It's important to note that these new technologies can play a negative as well as a positive role in advancing the cause of freedom and liberalization.[19]

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19 See Evgeny Morozov. *The Net Delusion. The Dark Side of Internet Freedom.* Public Affairs, New York, 2011.

Beyond fairness: the role of women in building security

by Jamila Seftaoui

Only since 1995, at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, have women's rights been officially and explicitly recognized by the international community as human rights.

Since then, these basic claims, supported by a number of resolutions, conventions and programmes, have gradually gained a foothold in policies for development and peace worldwide. In the second half of the nineties, the international community opened its eyes to the massive sexual violence and rape used as a systematic weapon of war in various armed conflicts across the globe, notably in the Balkans and in Rwanda. In 2000, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was adopted and came as a strong call for the protection of women in conflict situations and, subsequently, for their involvement as important players in preventing conflict and building peace.

If, today, the importance of women's participation is acknowledged in many sectors such as education, health or the environment, the recognition of their role in building stability and preventing conflict has not yet become part of the daily practice of national and international entities dedicated to advancing security and peace.

This situation has prompted women activists and policy advisers across organizations to help draft a number of resolutions and conventions and contribute to a rich literature in an ongoing attempt to motivate and win support for women's involvement for peace and security.

The role of women with regard to security, resolution of conflicts and building peace

There are different rationales for women's involvement in security initiatives that may be summarized in three categories:

1) the normative rationale is based on a legal and ethical approach that women, as human beings, should have access to all freedoms, protection and natural rights that are granted to all humans without further discussion. This also means that it is not fair to exclude them from building peace and security.

2) the instrumental rationale, meaning that all groups of a given population — including women — should participate in improving services after conflict and that their absence may curtail or diminish global efforts. This is the case, for example, in efforts of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of soldiers after conflicts.

3) the utilitarian or opportunistic rationale builds on lessons learned from the observed benefits of women's involvement in conflict prevention and security building. This approach typically attempts to build a convincing case for behavioural change in society and organizations towards the aim of actively engaging women in peace and security.

My presentation will be centered on cases that show the linkages between women and security in this third sense.

Women invest high stakes in preventing, ending and recovering from conflict

Traditionally, most conflicts are started and prolonged by male representatives of communities or nations. Women, on the contrary, are not or only very marginally represented in decision-making by combatants or among warlords. Although they often support the warriors logistically or morally within their respective societal groups, they often pay a disproportionately high toll in armed conflict,

due to devastated economies, infrastructure and households, loss of family and friends, destruction of their economic livelihoods, the burden of caring for psychologically and/or physically disabled survivors and above all, sexual violence and severe abuse during conflicts.

No wonder, then, to see women among the first to work towards avoiding conflicts. When armed conflicts break out, they develop survival strategies aimed at preserving or restoring peaceful lives for themselves and their families. Lessons from Northern Ireland, South Africa and the Balkans show that, if given a choice, women will vote for a solution that re-establishes security for them and their communities, regardless of whether this will happen through winning an armed conflict or not.

Often, women are likely to use their gender roles (as mothers for example) to establish dialogue with other members from the warring parties across political, religious, class or ethical divides in search of common ground for security.

When given a chance to be involved in peace negotiations, women have thus shown their ability to build consensus and to negotiate not in terms of war, but of deliverables for peace. Despite their low representation in these crucial bodies, it is widely acknowledged that their capacity to show empathy with oppressed groups, their skills in non-violent, pragmatic communication and their greater focus on moving ahead towards reconciliation and reconstruction were often decisive to lasting peace agreements.

This can be illustrated by the work of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, a political party formed in 1996 by women from all political and religious backgrounds to participate in elections for the Northern Ireland Forum, which helped ensure that at least one woman would be present at the negotiation table of what later became the Good Friday Agreement.[1] Throughout the long decades of conflict, women in Northern Ireland were engaged in informal processes of peace-building. Women were actively building bridges between the Catholic and Protestant factions long before the official peace negotiations began. Instead of focusing on old injustices, they discussed solutions and strategies for healthcare or education. These women developed a common cause that in time influenced public opinion. By co-operating despite their religious or political divides, they offered a peaceful alternative which showed that, despite a long and bloody history, respectful coexistence is possible.

Women have innovative and effective ideas that reach across divides

Margaret Ward reported how in the fragile Northern Ireland peace talks, women continued to negotiate, even when most male leaders of the conflicting parties left the meeting room in exasperation and in an atmosphere of heated egos. Women rather focused on concrete measures that were beneficial to all members of society in Northern Ireland and that, therefore, were less controversial: in concrete terms, they were addressing education, health, improving access to infrastructure, ensuring secure ways to and continuity of schools for children, and so on.[2]

She further noted that during the peace talks, women paid attention to seemingly small details that would turn out to be crucial to the quality of the talks. One such detail was the seating arrangement: parties used to sit in blocs, one confronting the other at each part of the table, emphasizing and sometimes exacerbating differences. Representatives of the Women Coalition Party, however, advocated that the negotiators be seated alphabetically around the table.

Many parties had entered the peace talks as strangers and potential enemies and this seating arrangement ensured that at least some of them developed neutral or interested relationships with each other during the following two years. It is noteworthy that in this example, the process of how delegates were to negotiate was as important to women as was the substance of what was to be negotiated.

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1   See statement by Margaret Ward at the OSCE roundtable on gender and security: "Involving women: A key issue in security and peace reconstruction", OSCE, Vienna, 11 March 2009, http://www.osce.org/gender/62622.

2   Ibid.

In all societies, women are deeply rooted in their communities and as such have tremendous roles to play in times of peace and conflict alike

In times of crisis, alert observers have often been able to anticipate events just by closely watching how women behaved in conflict-prone communities. Women would note, for example, that the male family members were collecting and stocking arms, holding meetings to discuss hostile issues or that they were mentally preparing themselves for aggressions to come. Fearing that a conflict was about to break out, the women would try to secure and store larger amounts of food and commodities. It has also been noted that the degree of domestic violence against women rises sharply in periods preceding wars or armed conflicts.[3]

In some border areas of Central Asia, it has been reported that intelligence officers would be able to assemble valuable early warning information just from analysing the behaviour of women in a given geographical area, such as their sudden absence from weekly markets or big community gatherings. Thus, strategic interaction with women can be crucial to collecting essential details on imminent armed conflicts, gathering evidence about hostilities or laying the ground for mediation and healing after conflicts.

An example from Argentina[4] illustrates how women can be crucial to the success of security measures when they seem to have no leverage at all on the main cause of insecurity, in this case small arms and light weapons (SALW). Although young men are the principle owners and direct victims of the arms, indirect victims include everyone. There are also indications that the presence of SALW increases violence against women including murder, intimidation, rape, torture, sexual abuse and harassment, forced prostitution and trafficking. In Argentina, a large-scale awareness raising campaign focused on family and community security was launched in 2008, and the resulting gun buyback action was an enormous success thanks to the efforts of women. In a national opinion poll conducted prior to the buyback action, more women than men considered that having a gun in the home was dangerous, while more men than women thought that a gun provided security. The campaign's main message was centred on the wish for gun-free homes. Women who knew where the SALW were stored responded massively: although 95% of gun owners were male, women were responsible for 50% of the SALW handed in during the buyback action.

Before, during and after conflict, women are key players in events in their communities and they usually have vital responsibilities towards families and in civil society

During armed conflicts women have had to find solutions to survive and run their households, taking responsibility for the children, the disabled and wounded. They sustain many networks across communities and are thus ready to contribute to reconciliation as well as reconstruction.

For example, in Germany after the Second World War, German society benefited substantially from the millions of *Truemmerfrauen* (women of debris), who diligently reconstructed buildings, infrastructure and businesses amid apocalyptic scenes of ravaged cities, annihilated livelihoods and destroyed lives. Similar efforts can also be observed in current reconstruction in Iraq, Afghanistan or Haiti, where women volunteer massively to care for families and victims and where they apply their organizational talents and work force to ensure basic services in devastated communities when state-run public services are nonexistent.

During recent events in North Africa and the Middle East, the remarkable presence of women among the demonstrators and activists showed that they can contribute a high potential for political change, even when women are not granted full political and social rights and when they suffer from patriarchal structures. As they are often part of NGOs working for individual freedoms or local development and are also playing an active role in civil society or citizens' movements, they represent a considerable added value to stimulate social movements and to give them more confidence and credibility.

As is obvious to any intelligent observer, it would be foolish not to consider women's views, their authority and contributions when shaping more democratic institutions in these countries. Tunisia,

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3   See Gender and SSR toolkit, practice notes. DCAF/INSTRAW/OSCE-ODIHR (2008), http://www.osce.org/odihr/70294.

4   See presentation by Sarah Masters, Women's Network Coordinator for the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) in the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation on 28 October 2009, http://www.osce.org/fsc/40067.

for example, is supporting mandatory parity between women and men on electoral lists for the first elections to be held after the 'Tunisian revolution', scheduled for 2011.[5]

The role of women in security should be recognized more and their voices heard more often: the OSCE framework for gender equality and women's involvement in security initiatives

The OSCE is committed to promoting gender equality, involving women and mainstreaming gender throughout its policies, programmes and activities. In 2004, the 56 OSCE participating States adopted with Ministerial Decision 14/04 the *2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality.*[6]

The action plan determines three areas of action:
- Mainstreaming gender in the Organization's structures, recruitment procedures and working environment;
- Mainstreaming gender across policies, programmes, projects and activities in the three OSCE security dimensions (the politico-military, the environmental and economic, and the human dimension);
- Promoting the rights, interests and concerns of women in six priority areas, among them the prevention and resolution of conflicts and rehabilitation processes.

The OSCE has adopted three additional Ministerial Decisions for the protection and involvement of women:

Ministerial Council Decision 14/05 on *Women in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation* integrates UNSCR 1325, as appropriate, into the Organization's own obligations and calls on the participating States and the OSCE executive structures to take action for women's full and equal participation in all phases and levels of conflict prevention, resolution and peace building.

Ministerial Council Decision 15/05 on *Preventing and Combating Violence against Women* urges the participating States to take all necessary steps to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence against women and girls.

Ministerial Council Decision 7/09 on *Women's Participation in Political and Public Life* addresses the under-representation of women in decision-making structures and calls on participating States to take action for legal and operational measures to facilitate women's increased participation in decision-making processes in all spheres of political and public life.

Conclusion

It should be emphasized that, beyond reasons of fairness and social justice, women should be involved in security matters because, if truly involved, they bring a tremendous added value to security measures and policies for the benefit of all. As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said about the need to make women a cornerstone of foreign policy: "It is not just the right thing to do. It's the smart thing".[7]

In the UN and in other international organizations, it is agreed that the Millennium Development Goals to reduce poverty and improve education, health and the environment are impossible to achieve if women continue to be excluded and discriminated against.

Despite this, the role of women in times of peace and conflict continues to be widely unrecognized by the decision makers who do not consider women's needs when it comes to the allocation of resources, the formulation of policies or representation in public offices. Analysis by UN Women of emergency and post-conflict spending patterns indicates that only two percent of post-conflict budgets target women's empowerment, their involvement or gender equality.

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5 Gender parity at the ballot box, another Tunisian revolution, by Kaouther Larbi, AFP, 21 April 2011.

6 http://www.osce.org/mc/23295

7 Hillary Clinton's message for the 100th anniversary of International Women's Day, 7 March 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/157647.htm.

As political policymakers look to women to help bring stability to Afghanistan and countries in the Middle East, efforts must be redoubled to enable a critical mass of representation of women in public and political office, on economic and financial boards, and in all vital decision-making spheres.

Women have proven in many situations to be reliable partners in preventing conflicts and in the establishment and sustainability of security. Wars may have been won with only men, but a lasting peace cannot be won without women.

Jamila Seftaoui is the OSCE Senior Adviser on Gender Issues.

The Arab uprisings
and their challenges

by Salam Kawakibi

Introduction

The Arab region is going through a turbulent period. Decisive events are happening that will radically change the political nature of the Arab countries, countries that have in the past few years experienced structural problems with respect to political reforms. The first months of 2011 saw several protest movements in North Africa but also in the other Arab states. The protagonists chose the word "revolution" to define what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. That cuts short any external, often "Euro-centric", desire to add nuance to this definition or attribution. The same context leads us to observe that the cultural analyses during these last months questioning the suitability of Arab societies for democracy have been overtaken.

New forms of communication as well as the role of the armed forces have been identified as being, each in their way, essential factors in the success and achievement of these revolutions to different degrees. This article will also consider the impact of certain regional actors and developments that impact on the development of democracy (Turkey, the Gulf states and the conflict with Israel). Finally, it will attempt to foresee what the near future will bring.

New forms of communication

In Tunisia, control of the media was one of the areas most valuable to the former regime. In order to get around censorship, Tunisians considerably developed their use of social networks and blogs as tools to pass on information. Since 17 December 2010, the challenges to the regimes have proved, with their evolution, the primary role played by these means of communication. The fall of the regime opened the way for a branching out of this sector without it being dominated by any one of the emerging political forces. The broadcast of the events is happening almost in real time and well before they are picked up by the "liberated" Tunisian or pan-Arab channels that have been very active on the ground since 14 January 2011. These networks have allowed anonymous individuals to speak, to position themselves in relation to current events.

A new pan-Arabism is born - for the techniques and procedures were imitated and prominent in the Egyptian case. Far from artificial ideologies and outdated slogans, the youth of the Arab countries, the new citizens, have succeeded in reinventing a new definition of Arab nationalism more connected to the values of democracy, freedom and dignity. Egypt was first to receive the Tunisian momentum through communication. We have seen a very "constructive" exchange taking place between the young people of both countries on the best ways to communicate and influence in the virtual space. In the other Arab countries, the common point was the apparent surprise in the media. In Syria for example, and after a period of hesitation, the media focused on the instability that the uprisings could cause, thereby making a link between the relations of the "defunct" regimes with the West as the main reason for their downfall. In contrast, blogs of all stripes welcomed these uprisings. In Algeria, the state media gave minimal coverage, clearly reflecting the unease and anxiety of the government. In the private press and on news websites, there was enthusiasm and claims that a revolution of the same type was not out of the question. Calls were made to the ruling power to seize the opportunity for reform before it was too late.

Social networks have been a major source for foreign media. Al-Jazeera was the first channel to use clips filmed by the protesters. It has become the 'Tunisian' channel par excellence. One of its

journalists[1] underlined that 'after long years where we were unable to send one cameraman, we find ourselves with hundreds of them - the protesters themselves who are our primary sources."

The armies — a reassuring factor for the people or for the dictators?

The armed forces in the Arab world have long rhymed with 'coup d'Etat' and 'state of emergency'. The institution was at the origin of the political systems and the ultimate guarantor thereof. In Tunisia and Egypt, however, they dissociated themselves from the police force by recognizing as legitimate the grievances of the protesters and, eventually, let go of the key.

The majority of Arab leaders, whether they were challenged or not, quickly understood the danger that the army could represent. They have all tried to marginalize and neutralize it. In parallel, the heads of state have developed a complex system of security apparatus whose mission of protection of the state has been transformed into protection of the regime. The security services control the daily activities of citizens. The security agencies become the direct implementers of policy and exercise control over the public space. More security means less politics and leads political institutions to rot. The characteristics of the security systems of the Arab world are no different to what Latin America experienced before its transitions: a shield between the state and society, functioning in a closed circuit of units with a culture of impunity that encourages an inexorable logic of terror.

The mass insurrections have broken the closed circuit in which this apparatus operates. The uprising of the people has led to the separation of the institutions that serve the regime from those that serve the state — primarily the army.

The Tunisian army, long distanced from political decisions, has not been corrupted. The Egyptian military, by contrast, has been in power since the 1952 revolution. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, adopting a nationalist ideology, kept the army from involvement in profiteering. However, his successor, Anwar El-Sadat, also from the army and a champion of economic liberalism that benefitted a new parasitic bourgeoisie, introduced the culture of corruption as a means of ensuring the army's loyalty. Over the last ten years, the resentment of the military towards recent President Hosni Mubarak grew. The president provoked discontent by allowing a small circle of businessmen to gravitate around his heir apparent in order to grab increasing amounts of wealth.

The big difference resides in the nature of the military intervention. In Tunisia, the army acted to protect the people. The Egyptian army, for its part, imposed itself at the beginning of the events to fill the security gap. Afterwards, it remained neutral until the point where it took the decision to break with the dying regime and to preserve the system. After the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, the army is poised to fix the conditions for a return to civil power.

Turkey — an example to follow?

Turkey's diplomatic ambitions, which were timidly deployed in the 2000s, are now more assured. The country's new foreign policy is a long-term strategy. However, the reticence felt in Europe towards the integration of Turkey has played a primary role in its new orientations. While waiting for Europe, Turkey has developed ambitions to become a real medium-sized power. Its leaders are convinced that an influential Turkey would reinforce its arguments to persuade the EU to accept its membership.

According to Ahmet Davutoglu,[2] the architect of Turkish diplomacy, Turkey is a "country of multidimensional geography", it should adopt a "policy of peace", become a pole of "regional stability" and reach a situation of "zero problems with its neighbours", through soft power. The leaders of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) party have realized that it is possible to change the rules of the game in the surrounding areas that "encircle" them and that were once the monopoly of the great powers.

The political and economic weight of Turkey was reinforced during the Arab revolutions. The return of Egypt on the regional chessboard is unlikely to weaken the Turkish role. The two countries will work in the areas of their interests. Turkish political expertise on democratic transition, the

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1   Mohammad Kreichan, al-Jazeera.

2   Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararasi konumu 2001.

coexistence of conflicting forces and the management of the relationship between the political and the military, represent areas conducive to co-operation. Turkey plays and will continue to play a decisive role in the peace process between the Arab countries and Israel, despite the tensions of recent months with the right-wing Israeli government. This conflict, without a just and equitable solution, remains the crux of all problems.

The Arab-Israeli conflict

The attachment in the minds of Arab societies to the Palestinian question is a constant that needs to be taken into account in order to understand the alchemy of this region. Public opinion is more than ever concerned by this enduring conflict. Like every socio-political action in the countries of the region since the creation of the United Nations, the decision to sign peace treaties was not taken with the agreement of the peoples, but was taken from above, marginalizing public opinion completely. Peace therefore existed only between governments; it is completely absent from the minds and cultures of the two sides. Therefore it is necessary to reflect on the measures to take so that peace can be adopted in the Arab and Israeli public mindsets.

In the current situation, that is mission impossible. The occupation of the Palestinian territories with the blockading of "autonomous" territories render the economic situation of Palestinians unbearable, and the sense of injustice and rejection only serves to increase the barriers to any hope of a political improvement that would lead to economic development.

Trying to resolve conflict with further conflict seems like political suicide. Bringing the belligerents to talks without preconditions could be a solution. That would imply a recognition of the different parties without prior selectivity. The representatives of the different sides are chosen by those concerned even if that choice seems wrong for some — such as the election of Hamas — but that does not affect their credibility within their own society.

The Gulf states, an important factor

The Gulf states are going through a very critical moment in their eventful history. On the one hand, the question of the legitimacy of their leaders worries some (Bahrain), the rise of Islamism others (Kuwait), while still others are concerned with terrorist networks financed by a fraction in power (Saudia Arabia) and the competition at the head of a heterogeneous composition (the Emirates). Competition for hegemony over the region is reflected by the use of oil money to influence allegiances. We observe the growing role of Saudia Arabia as vector of American policy in the Middle East. Qatar tries to play the role of a free electron with a policy that includes overtures towards Israel and support to radical movements. The question is to know in which direction the autocratic regimes of the Gulf states will go: will they open up politically or will they remain in a state of stagnation? One cannot help but notice the timid overtures in the organization of municipal elections in Saudia Arabia and legislative elections in Kuwait. The region is littered with US military bases and internal security is assured by the experts of various Western countries. That shows the fragility of these states. Their fears after the Arab revolutions risk being transformed into efforts of political "sabotage" in the form of manipulation of financial aid in the Arab countries, aid which they will need in the short and long term.

Prospects for democratization and reform

Since the beginning of the 2000s, great hope rose in some quarters, from the Maghreb to the Mashreq, with the accession to power of King Mohammed VI of Morocco, of King Abdullah in Jordan, of President Bashir Assad in Syria and of Prince Hamad in Qatar. Hope quickly faded and disappointment was such the people, particularly the young, began to make themselves heard. With the economic crisis, institutionalized corruption, very high unemployment, virulent repression and a muzzled public space, social protest transformed "effortlessly" into political protest in its most concrete version.

In this context, Arab civil societies have significantly developed. They have succeeded in taking root in countries where reforms have been committed to, like in Morocco and Jordan. Consequently three forms of civil society have crystallized in the region:

- genuine civil society that manages, with great difficulty, to make its way through a minefield;
- GONGOs, "Governmental non-governmental organizations". Behind these one always finds members of the ruling families. GONGOs, which try to replace the failing social role of the state, manage to obtain European aid;
- The civil society of receptions and cocktails, which develops around Western embassies. This is where diplomats or Europeans in postings abroad find their "natural" interlocutors, for understandable reasons: they speak their language, the drink alcohol like they do, their wives do not wear veils, etc. This is a "desirable" formula. The reality is contrary to this paradigm.

To remedy these gaps, it is necessary to rely on European civil societies and for them to provide a transitional link for the Mediterranean policies of Europe.

It should be noted that the Turkish example brings areas for reflection that could eventually help develop ideas for the future of Arab civil societies so that the religious and secular currents can coexist.

Civil societies will flourish in the post-revolutionary period. Western donors will focus their efforts on setting up "efficient" and transparent" programmes. But the needs should be defined by those who are directly concerned. It would be much wiser to respond to the expectations and requirements expressed by credible actors from within the civil societies of the countries undergoing transformation.

In the "revolutionary" movement that has invaded the Arab states, the fears of a counter-revolutionary current remains on the table. Everything will depend on the transition and its management. Thus, the religious political movements (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Al-Nahda in Tunisia) "sow panic" among the "secular" ranks with their weight and organization. It should be said that that remains in the realm of speculation or exaggeration. Even if the first stages of the new political restructuring tends towards some confusion over the foundations of the democratic convictions of certain radical representatives of religious movements, that should not jeopardize the entire process of constructive national dialogue.

Conclusion

It is important to underscore that the fear that was ingrained in the minds of the people of the Arab countries during the decades of humiliation and repression has changed sides. The Arab leaders now have the "opportunity" to share this feeling. Rule by emergency laws is the most vivid manifestation of weakness. The Arab regimes, in the majority, have no legitimacy. They have aborted all attempts at development. In order to remain in power for the longest possible time they have developed systemic corruption so as to have a share in the proceeds, eventually distributing some to protective elements that help them to muzzle public life. They have even confiscated civil society by encouraging the creature of a tailor-made civil society, as corrupt and prone to patronage as the ruling power itself. Finally, they have rendered the press dumb if not complicit. The undermining of these "tigers of the sand" is no longer surprising with a good understanding of their functioning and composition.

The most important revolution that has taken place is that of the will against submission and of audacity against fear. Transition is not easy and has several preconditions. The transition period remains very critical and fragile, but the capacity of those who succeeded in overthrowing tyrants will not weaken before reluctance, sabotage and bad intentions. This process will require the support of Europe, the nearest neighbour whose economic interests and interest in political stability should push it to support the democratic process after having long supported the authoritarian regimes. Foreign intervention that supports democratic transition is more than necessary. It goes without saying that the citizens of this region will bear the bulk of the task, but without external help their mission will be threatened. This help could take several forms: the further development of national

economies and help out of corruption and bad management. The experiences of the democratic transitions that took place in southern Europe (Spain, Portugal and Greece) could present a useful model, notably in the area of elections preparation and security sector reform.

Salam Kawakibi is Director of Research at the Arab Reform Initiative.

Annex I: Agenda

Building bridges:
security community and partnerships for change

- Challenges in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region – conflicts, security 'vacuums', grey areas
- Multi-track diplomacy – the role of civil society, women and media
- North Africa – supporting democratic development and the lessons of transition

Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, 5 April 2011

10.00-10.30	Welcome by Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, Director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University Address by the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Ažubalis Address by OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut
10.30-12.00	**Euro-Atlantic security agenda: from institution-building to problem-solving** Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow (Russia and Eurasia), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London **Conflict and reconciliation in a 21st century Euro-Atlantic security order** Matthew Rojansky, Deputy Director Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC **Moderator**: Ramūnas Vilpišauskas
12.00-14.00	Lunch **Keynote speaker:** H.E. President Valdas Adamkus
14.00-14.45	**Transformations of civil society after the presidential elections in Belarus** Victor Martinovich, Head of Political Science Department European Humanities University, Vilnius **Moderator:** Matthew Rojansky
14.45-15.30	**International broadcasting: Cold War impact on the USSR, current challenges in Middle East and North Africa crisis areas** R. Eugene Parta, co-editor, *Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* **Moderator:** Virginie Coulloudon, OSCE Spokesperson
15.30-16.15	**Beyond fairness: the role of women in building security** Jamila Seftaoui, OSCE Senior Adviser on Gender Issues, OSCE Secretariat, Vienna **Moderator:** Virginie Coulloudon
16.15-17.00	**North Africa – democratic development and the international community** Salam Kawakibi, Research Director, Arab Reform Initiative, Paris **Moderator:** Jamila Seftaoui
17:00-17:10	Wrap-up

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