**4.6. "The Current Situation of Regional Security
Co-operation and its Future,
from European Viewpoint"**

I.

Introduction

For almost four years now Japan has been closely associated with the work of the OSCE. In this short period our institution has changed dramatically. From the "Conference on ..." it has become the "**Organization for** Security and Co-operation in Europe".   Japan not only witnessed this change–it became part of it. Since last December the OSCE officially refers to Japan as an OSCE "Partner for Co-operation".

This partnership reflects Japan's growing involvement in European co-operation. It is also an expression of the obvious link between security in the OSCE area and in neighbouring regions. The OSCE area extends from Vancouver to Vladivostok. This is at Japan's doorstep.

Attendance at and participation in OSCE meetings offer Japan the possibility of actively following European security issues. We appreciate the contributions Japan has made to OSCE debates and its participation in some of the OSCE's operational activities. As the OSCE moves forward with the civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreements on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Japan's support would be most welcome.

The implementation of the military and civilian parts of the Dayton Agreements, signed in Paris, is a test for new, post-Cold-War structures of security. In Bosnia and Herzegovina NATO works side by side with Russia and other non-NATO countries under a UN Security Council mandate; the OSCE and the Council of Europe work closely with UNHCR and a UN police force; the European Union has a key role in economic reconstruction, together with the World Bank. In short: the structure set up by the international community for finally achieving peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina has assigned key roles to regional organizations within a UN framework.

II.

The Charter of the United Nations and the Role of Regional Arrangements: A New Chance for "Regionalism"

When the founders of the United Nations were discussing arrangements for maintaining international peace and security in the post-World-War period, they saw an important role for regional bodies in solving regional conflicts. Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations explicitly encourages UN Member States to "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council."

However, because of the emergence of East-West confrontation, at least in Europe, there was no room for applying Chapter VIII. The United Nations had no chance to ease East-West confrontation. Instead, the United Nations itself was a theater of the Cold War, which made it almost irrelevant to European security.

The establishment of NATO and the Western European Union was the response to a threat to international peace and security that exceeded the UN's possibilities. Under the conditions of the Cold war, different political groupings, regional economic bodies and integration structures emerged; although established on fundamentally different bases, they all reflected the evolving security arrangements of a divided continent.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975 was the first pan-European and transatlantic effort to erase the lines of confrontation and division. Fifteen years later, in the late 1980s, a series of popular peaceful revolutions in the communist-bloc countries marked the end of Europe's – and the world's – division. With the Charter of Paris (1990), former enemies created a basis of common values: human rights, democracy, rule of law, market economies and social justice. This prepared the ground for comprehensive regional and subregional co-operation between countries in all parts of the CSCE area. The United Nations benefited in many ways. A new sense of co-operation, in particular among the permanent members of the Security Council, provided the United Nations with unprecedented political strength and vitality.

But the end of the Cold War also brought with it unforeseen negative consequences. The end of Soviet domination gave rise to many regional conflicts and tensions. Most of them had long lain dormant under the tight control, either direct or indirect, of the communist superpower. In the OSCE area devastating wars were and still are being waged in the countries of former Yugoslavia, in Tajikistan, in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, and in the Republic of Chechnya in the Russian Federation. We saw bloodshed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both regions of Georgia. Moldova, too, was stricken by a civil war.

No one was prepared to deal with these conflicts. The UN had little experience in European affairs. For NATO, the WEU and the Council of Europe, these conflicts were "out of area". The CSCE had practically no operational capabilities. Thus, regional organizations within the OSCE area had to urgently adjust their tasks and structures to meet the new challenges of the transition period.

The subsidiarity principle, enshrined in Article 52 of the UN Charter, had to be made operational: structures had to be developed or created so that regional problems could be solved within the region.

III.

Regional Security Co-operation in Europe: Present-day Realities

As an integral part of the transition process following the era of East-West confrontation, all regional security structures within the OSCE area are in the process of fundamental change. At the same time, the substance and character of their interrelations are also changing. It is important to understand that this overall process of change is still in a very active phase. These ongoing changes are not conceived on the drawing board. They are the results of very complex dynamic developments. And they involve difficult and sometimes potentially dangerous growing pains.

As part of this process of overall transition and transformation, the OSCE has become an organization with a broad spectrum of operational possibilities and concrete tasks. The Charter of Paris established common values as the foundation of the OSCE. The number of States has increased considerably, in particular as a result of the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Fortunately, however, the OSCE has maintained an all-inclusive membership in its area between Vancouver and Vladivostok. This has led to an increase in membership to 54 OSCE States.

The OSCE today is a security organization with a comprehensive concept of security in which military aspects of security are no longer the dominant element. The Organization has a central role to play in the promotion of a security space common to its entire area. Its serves as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. It works to strengthen human rights, consolidate democracy and the rule of law and to promote all aspects of a civil society. It contributes to upholding confidence in the military field and to fostering co-operative approaches to security. The OSCE has developed readily available structures for consultation and negotiation. With its all-inclusive membership, the OSCE is called upon to promote indivisible security within its space. In particular, preventing new divisions is a new and important task of the OSCE. The peace agreements for Bosnia and Herzegovina have provided the OSCE with a particular, unprecedented operational challenge. The OSCE has been tasked with taking the lead in supervising the preparation and conduct of elections, with monitoring human rights and with assisting in negotiations on confidence building measures and arms control.

After the end of East-West confrontation, the European Union became an anchor of stability for the whole of Europe. Association agreements with Central and Eastern European countries, including prospects for enlargement, and partnership agreements with other Eastern European countries project stability well beyond the Union's current 15

members. The EU-launched Stability Pact helped to consolidate good-neighbourly relations in Central and Eastern Europe and eliminate potential sources of conflict. With its political and economic potential, the EU plays an important role in implementing the peace Agreements for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU's common foreign and security policy strengthens OSCE involvement in many conflict situations, including its efforts in Chechnya.

NATO has developed close institutional links with its former adversaries. Through the establishment of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and the conclusion of Partnership for Peace agreements, it is establishing patterns of co-operation with its new partners, in full conformity with the principles of the OSCE. NATO has offered support, on a case-by-case basis, for OSCE action in conflict prevention and crisis management. NATO countries carry the burden of the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Agreements.

The Western European Union (WEU) is becoming an integral part of the development of the European Union and its efforts to project stability throughout Europe.
The Council of Europe is well along with a process of rapid extension to include new members in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the United States has been granted observer status. Both developments foster the potential for co-operation between the COE and the OSCE.

The Commonwealth of Independent States, led by the Russian Federation, encompasses all parts of the former Soviet Union except the three Baltic States. At the CIS Summit in January 1996, President Yeltsin observed "a drastic shift towards an integrational community of States, while the trend towards voluntary integration has become a dominant one within the Commonwealth".

During the last few years a number of more or less comprehensive sub-regional structures have developed, from the Baltic Sea Council in the North to the Black Sea Economic Co-operation in the South.

Looking at this multitude of regional structures, one may ask whether there is not a high degree of redundancy. Where do all of these organizations find their proper place? Actually, co-operation and co-ordination work rather smoothly.

Let me cite as an example the case of the OSCE. There is no danger that the OSCE will one day become a UN-type body for Europe. Like NATO, the OSCE can provide co-operative and collective security, but not, as opposed to NATO, collective defense. Its relationship with NATO and other western security structures is clearly complementary and not an alternative. EU and NATO memberships will most likely never be all-inclusive in the OSCE area. Therefore, a balanced security structure must include a strong, all-inclusive, co-operative security organization where all States of the OSCE area find their place. It is an essential function of the OSCE to allow all participating States to work in full respect of OSCE principles and commitments for their legitimate interests and, at the

same time, to make their contribution to overall stability. We will not be able to manage today's extremely complex situation successfully if important aspects of comprehensive security are dealt with in an isolated, exclusive way. As an over-arching principle, "inclusion" is a key element of a co-operative security system.

It is increasingly evident that no one organization, global or regional, can go it alone. I think that within the OSCE area only a "pluralistic" structure will lead to long-term stability, for reasons of substantive and formal competence, for reasons of historically based differences in membership and – in the final analysis – for reasons of power-sharing. Hence, the great number of institutions and organizations is a strength, not a weakness of Europe's post-confrontation situation.

However, a central issue in the developing new security order in Europe is the relationship between this multitude of international organizations. While some basic elements are already in place, co-operation between the OSCE and other regional organizations is still complex, both politically and in practice.

The Helsinki Summit of the OSCE in 1992 stressed complementarity and excluded any form of hierarchy. The OSCE approach vis-à-vis other regional organizations is co-operative and not competitive. Peacekeeping operations are a case in point. The Helsinki Document expresses explicitly the OSCE's interest in co-operative support from NATO and other organizations in OSCE-led peacekeeping. The OSCE could go as far as giving a "mandate" to another regional organization for a peacekeeping operation within the OSCE area, although this has not yet been done. On the other hand, the central role of the OSCE in the European security architecture has been recognized in political statements by NATO and other regional organizations. The Budapest Summit in 1994 directed the OSCE to pursue more systematic and practical co-operation between itself and other regional and transatlantic organizations and institutions that share its values and objectives.

What does all this mean in practice? Representatives of the United Nations and other international organizations attend major OSCE meetings. They contribute to seminars held within the OSCE framework. The OSCE is invited to attend meetings of other organizations. It enjoys observer status at the UN General Assembly. Officials of the organizations at all levels have direct and often daily contacts on a broad range of issues. In the field of the Human Dimension, multilateral meetings involving the United Nations, UNHCR, the ICRC and the Council of Europe are a regular practice.

But in spite of these many contacts and ties, the present situation falls short of fully using the potential of mutually reinforcing co-operation. It is sometimes difficult to agree concretely on the specific distribution of tasks and a division of labour based on comparative advantages.

Some of the underlying problems can be qualified as bureaucratic. International organizations, like all bureaucracies, are tempted with "empire building". They may look

for new tasks in order to become more relevant or more powerful. For the same reasons, they may be concerned with "empire-maintaining" and therefore reluctant to share responsibilities with other organizations.

More difficult to overcome are obstacles of a political nature. Some elements of the developing European architecture are controversial. There are differing views on the role of NATO and the scale and pace of its possible expansion. The perception of the nature and political perspectives of the CIS is another controversial issue. Like the future role of NATO, it is directly related to a still unresolved problem of the transition period: the position of the Russian Federation within the European and transatlantic security structures.

IV.

A Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st Century and the Relations between Regional Organizations

Bearing in mind the broad spectrum of new challenges, the OSCE Summit in Budapest in December 1994 launched a discussion on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model in the OSCE area. This discussion affords an opportunity for OSCE States to articulate security concerns and propose concepts for addressing them. The work on the Model contributes to setting up a security agenda for the OSCE in the coming years.

The OSCE Ministerial Council last December established guidelines for further discussion, including:

– "to develop further the relationship between the OSCE and the United Nations...", and

– "to contribute to the transparent and democratic evolution of regional and transatlantic organizations with a view to strengthening confidence, security and stability in the OSCE region."

The Security Model discussion should thus lead to enhanced co-operation and a constructive interrelationship between the international organizations active in security and stability building in the OSCE area.

Although the discussion of a Security Model is still very far from final conclusions, some aspects are already taking shape. There seems to be broad support for a flexibly developing network of interlocking and overlapping structures, linked via mutually supportive and reinforcing co-operation. The network would include the OSCE, the European Union, WEU, NATO, the Council of Europe, as well as the CIS and sub-regional frameworks for co-operation.

This network would be characterized by the following features:

– a network can develop organically; this will provide flexibility and leave room for dynamic development;

– a network does not create hierarchies or subordination;

– a network with direct or indirect links between all organizations included in it ensures that all organizations, in principle, remain open to new members and thereby avoid "fortress building".

Within a network, each organization contributes to the stability of the whole network structure, from which all individual States will benefit, regardless of whether they belong to a certain organization.

The implementation of the Dayton Agreements for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a test of the capacities of such a network. In an unprecedented way, the Dayton Agreements involved the UN and a great number of regional organizations and countries both within and outside the OSCE area in the implementation of its provisions. Lasting peace can only be achieved if all organizations co-operate so that all tasks assigned to them can be fulfilled.

V.

Europe and the Global Security System

Europe's security situation is a specific one compared to other regions. Security co-operation in the OSCE area started in the early 1970s. Since the end of East-West confrontation, its forms and structures have considerably developed. It is, however, crucial to understand that the OSCE's increasing relevance and role are not the result of structural management. The key to the OSCE's development was the creation of a common understanding of the "Human Dimension", the "collective conscience of our community" (Helsinki Summit Declaration). The recognition by all OSCE States that Human Dimension issues "do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned" (ibid) opened up new possibilities for co-operative OSCE measures. The OSCE States are pursuing the ambitious goal "of a community of nations with no divisions, old or new, in which the sovereign equality and the independence of all States are fully respected, there are no spheres of influence and the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, social origin or of belonging to a minority are rigorously protected."

The set-up and roles of regional organizations differ from one region to another. Europe's experience is unique, just as the experience of any other region. For America, especially its Central and Southern parts, the Organization of American States was the dominant regional arrangement with some sub-regional initiatives. A similar pan-regional arrangement was established in Africa as the Organization of African Unity. In Asia, too, regional structures seem to be developing. It is obvious that geographical concepts alone cannot determine the extension of regional organizations. The OSCE area covers all of Europe, North America and parts of Asia. Just as Europe, in geographical terms, was too small for comprehensive regional co-operation, so might Asia at this point be too large for a single comprehensive regional structure.

For these reasons it is very difficult to transfer experience with regional organizations from one area to another. The same is true of the relationship of regional organizations with the United Nations.

Each region will develop its specific model of relations within the region and with the UN.

The OSCE is interested in building a strong, organic link with the United Nations. One important reason for this is to ensure a credible continuum of action in conflict prevention and crisis management. The OSCE has comparative advantages in the Human Dimension area and in preventive diplomacy and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE missions in areas of potential or real crisis and the activities of the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities are instruments available for coping with conflicts in the OSCE area. The "OSCE first" rule means using these instruments before burdening the United Nations. The OSCE, however, does not have any power of enforcement. In the event that its co-operative measures fail, a smooth procedure should transfer the matter to the United Nations Security Council. The OSCE States agree that they "may in exceptional circumstances jointly decide that a dispute will be referred to the UN Security Council on behalf of the OSCE."

For the OSCE its status as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides an important link with global security. The co-operative partnership with Japan as well as with Korea and the Mediterranean States of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia has established direct links with adjacent regions.

There is no doubt that security and stability in the OSCE area can only benefit from the establishment of effective and strong regional security institutions in the Asian-Pacific area.

VI.

The Future of Regional Security Co-operation

From a European perspective, it seems that regional security co-operation will gain in importance. European military security is not threatened by a major war in the European theater, but by local conflicts. Many of these conflicts can be more efficiently managed in the region. A regional problem is more easily perceived and understood within the region. This will make it easier to generate the necessary political and economic support and, possibly, the military force needed to deal with the conflict.

Regional organizations have another comparative advantage: they are relatively small and therefore more easily and perhaps also more efficiently managed than the complex structures of global organizations, in particular the UN.

However, regional security co-operation and regional organizations must be part of a strategic concept for strengthening global security. There can be no doubt that the major challenges, in the military security field and elsewhere, are global. Therefore, regional co-operation must be understood by all its actors, regional organizations and States within the

region, as being an integral part of global co-operation. This seems to be somewhat of a paradox, but in fact it is an aspect of our complex, interdependent world.

In organizational terms, this means that regional organizations should take Chapter VIII of the UN Charter seriously: they should see themselves as being, in a broad sense, part of the UN system. This would contribute considerably to strengthening and streamlining the UN – a UN that will grow stronger by concentrating on the global challenges and on those regional problems which cannot be solved regionally.

As Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali pointed out in his "Agenda for Peace", regional organizations "could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs".

There is room for discussing the potential of regional security co-operation as part of the worldwide effort to maintain international peace and security. The Secretary-General of the UN has invited the major regional organizations to a meeting that will take place this very week. It is only the second meeting of its kind and follows the first one held in 1994.

In whichever way we organize security in Europe, in Asia or elsewhere in today's world, we all share global responsibilities. Regional security co-operation is one way to cope effectively with these responsibilities.